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This thesis analyzes the political role of the German General Staff as well as civil-
military relations in Germany from the late 19th century until 1933. Specifically, it 
examines the rise and fall of Kurt von Schleicher. Together with Generals Paul von 
Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff, and Wilhelm Groener, Schleicher shaped the politics of 
the Weimar Republic, right up to the end that he—unintentionally—hastened when his 
intrigues paved the way for Adolf Hitler’s dictatorship. 
During World War I, the German army completed its control over the civilian 
administration and bureaucracy. In the Republic of Weimar 1919–1933, the military 
remained a powerful governmental player—as the self-anointed protector of the nation 
against external and internal threats, including democracy. 
Thus, Germany’s political situation in the winter of 1932–1933 and the activities 
of the key players stemmed from a long-term anti-democratic socialization process amid 
an entrenched civil-military imbalance. As the present thesis demonstrates, Schleicher’s 
life—from his military background to his experience as a member of Prussia’s noble 
Junker class—coincided with Germany’s tumultuous modernization. The fateful lessons 
that he drew from this experience ultimately spelled the end of Germany’s first 
democracy and ushered in the calamity of the Third Reich. 
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On 30 June 1934, Kurt von Schleicher, a general as well as a former chancellor of 
Germany, and his wife were assassinated in their home—by governmental order. They 
were victims of the so-called Night of the Long Knives that Adolf Hitler initiated to settle 
scores and eliminate rivals who might endanger his monopoly hold on political power in 
Germany as well as his absolute leadership in the Nazi party. Managed by the Nazi 
leaders Hermann Göring, Heinrich Himmler, and Reinhard Heydrich, days of bloody 
violence placed the final seal on Hitler’s dictatorship.  
Schleicher was accused of cooperating with foreign powers—namely with the 
French ambassador in Berlin, André François-Poncet. He also was alleged to have 
conspired with Ernst Röhm, the head of the Sturmabteilung (SA), to effect the putsch 
(Röhm-Putsch) at the heart of the trumped up “justifications” for these political murders.1 
Moreover, the Nazis circulated a false rumor that Schleicher had resisted arrest by using a 
weapon and, therefore, had to be shot. The seven bullet wounds on his body 
demonstrated that, in fact, a brutal assassination had occurred.2 
In many ways, Schleicher was the architect of his own fate; as a soldier-politician, 
he contributed meaningfully to the demise of Germany’s first democracy and the rise of 
Hitler—though he intended neither outcome. Indeed, like many of his fellow aristocratic 
officers in and out of uniform in the Weimar Republic, Schleicher surely thought his 
governmental machinations, including his relentless efforts to limit or roll back 
democracy, were in the best interests of the German nation. His fateful misperceptions 
owe to the world of ideas and outlooks in which he came of age—and the civil-military 
imbalance that characterized Germany in Schleicher’s time and place. His personality, 
character, and thinking were a result of a long-term socialization process from his 
                                                 
1 In fact, Schleicher had not seen the SA head in a year, and François-Poncet stated later that he had no 
indications that the former chancellor planned any kind of plot. (Heinz Höhne, “Mordsache Röhm,” Der 
Spiegel, 26 (25 June 1984), http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13509574.html, accessed May 29, 2013.) 
2 Heinz Höhne, “Mordsache Röhm,” Der Spiegel, 26 (25 June 1984), 
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13509574.html, accessed May 29, 2013. 
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experience in the German military and its General Staff in the episode of total war and its 
impact on central European mass politics. Although his reign as chancellor was short-
lived, Schleicher bears key responsibility for the collapse of the Weimar Republic into 
the Nazi Reich. Without realizing the consequences, his policies and short-sighted tactics 
of power in the cabinet intrigue of the epoch paved the way for Hitler’s dictatorship, 
which led to the worst disaster of state in the 20th century. 
Building on Schleicher’s example, the present study treats the general question of 
civil-military relations and especially the role of soldiers in politics in democratic states 
in crisis. The work at hand embodies an historical analysis of an episode that has interest 
for those concerned with the character of the past as well as those occupied with the 
challenges of democracy and arms in the present and future. 
This thesis shows why Schleicher’s cabinet and domestic politics failed so 
thoroughly. Specifically, it examines how his military and political socialization in the 
last years of the empire and the first years of the republic kept him from accepting 
democratic procedures or comprehensively understanding the shape of parliamentary 
politics and the related threats to the constitution. Furthermore, this study will enlighten a 
21st-century readership to the role of the German General Staff in political affairs as well 
as the theme of the soldier in politics and political crises involving generals in the 
limelight. 
A. THE GENERAL STAFF AND ITS INFLUENCE IN GERMAN POLITICS 
AND SOCIETY 
The Prussian and German armies that existed from 1648 to 1945 represented the 
leading power in the state of the time, which to some extent dominated governmental 
activities. Since 1871, and the unity by force of arms, the German General Staff played a 
significant role in—domestic and foreign—governmental affairs. Pluralistic forces in 
Germany, such as they were, sought to exert some political control over soldiers as it was 
the case in western democracies, but with little success. Eventually, flag officers 
dominated governmental action, and they were in both world wars significantly 
responsible for catastrophic political and military-strategic mistakes. Their blind loyalty 
  3
and their belief in the intellectual, strategic, and political superiority of the military over 
civilian authorities mainly originated during Germany’s integral nationalism and 
militarism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Moreover, Germany’s leaders 
considered military hierarchy and organization as appropriate for the society as a whole, 
ending with Hitler’s dictatorship, when it seemed that all German men and women wore 
a uniform. 
The German case in the first republic demonstrates the problem of the inadequate 
integration of the military into the constitutional power of the young state, which bore 
heavy burdens of the past. In particular, this case suggests how military leaders saw the 
General Staff as a force above partisan politics but—at least in their understanding—as 
the most relevant and competent element to conduct national governance in domestic and 
foreign affairs—either in the pre-1918 world of total war or in its successor epoch of the 
Weimar Republic. Thus, the General Staff worked far beyond its natural competences 
and became in fact a governmental actor with major power, after Otto von Bismarck left 
office 1890. 
In World War I, his service under the command of Paul von Hindenburg and 
Wilhelm Groener significantly militarized and influenced Schleicher. He became a major 
example of Germany’s technocratic elite in uniform. This powerful trio of former 3rd 
Army Supreme Command officers arose in German politics, and they “cooperated within 
a close network of ties of friendship.”3 In the Weimar Republic, these three flag officers 
played a partisan political role in the civil military affairs of the years 1919 to 1930. 
Early in his career, Schleicher made clear that, in his view, parliamentarianism 
would weaken Germany: “Long before his appointment as Reich chancellor, as eminence 
grise of Weimar politics, the general had worked hard to destroy parliamentary 
democracy in the state.”4 His trust in the abilities and in the mission of the German 
                                                 
3 Irene Strenge, Kurt von Schleicher - Politik im Reichswehrministerium am Ende der Weimarer 
Republik (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006), 53. (arbeiteten miteinander in einem engen Geflecht 
freundschaftlicher Beziehungen.) 
4 Dietrich Orlow, Weimar Prussia 1925–1933—The Illusion of Strength (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittburgh Press, 1991), 222. 
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military to rule the nation’s fate and, moreover, his blind faith in Reichspräsident 
Hindenburg—who had, together with Erich Ludendorff, implemented a military 
dictatorship in Germany after 1916 in war time Germany—led to a catastrophe. (Even 
before Schleicher took office as Chancellor, he contributed to the national myth that 
Hindenburg was Germany’s designated leader, her Übervater.) Schleicher’s political 
leadership is characterized as conniving, contradictory, opaque, and inconstant—the 
complete opposite how good governance should look or function. 
Eventually, Schleicher successfully weakened the parliamentary system and 
undermined the constitution of the Republic of Weimar. His politics made Hitler—the 
new German Messiah or, in German, the Erlöser—possible. Schleicher’s vita is an 
excellent example of a soldier in the arena of mass politics who overestimated his 
strategic skills and who lacked the essential capacity for comprehensive analysis of civil-
military forces beyond his control and experience. His career and his political activities 
serve as a warning of the risks that arise when soldiers of a specific kind and mentality 
are too deeply involved in politics. 
Being an anti-democratic conservative, alien to parliamentary politics and blind to 
the potential of totalitarianism in the 20th century, Schleicher aimed to restore the role of 
Germany’s nobility by eliminating the democratic Weimar Republic and re-establishing 
an authoritarian presidential government in Germany. Schleicher understood himself as a 
member of a ruling elite and soldierly caste, which, since 1848 at the latest, had not 
respected the political will of the German people. Unfortunately—and with disastrous 
results—this elite served the idealized and atavistic notion of a Prussian German state and 
not the nation in the form of a 20th century democracy on a shaky foundation. 
A major component of Schleicher’s failure was that the democratic parties 
“responded to the approaches of the agile General with deepest mistrust. They recalled 
his liking for intrigue and thought him incapable of a true return to regular government.”5 
The powerful trade-unions acted similar: “[T]he factory workers and the lesser trade-
                                                 
5 Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship—The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National 
Socialism (New York, Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 201 
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union would not have approved trade-unions support of the Schleicher government.”6 
Eventually, Schleicher’s political isolation paved the way for Hitler, ending with the 
collapse of Germany in 1945. 
B. MILITARY AND POLITICS: ALSO A 21ST-CENTURY ISSUE 
One of the leading questions in modern German history has been the failure of 
democracy in the face of crisis. This question was germane in the years before and after 
30 January 1933, as well as in the 1950s, with the creation of new German armies in the 
cold war. Moreover, the case at hand stands within the experience of Euro-Atlantic civil-
military relations generally, an understanding of which is central for any informed 
analysis for past and present questions of war and peace. Thus, the question at the heart 
of this thesis is relevant for a central European record of war and peace. 
This case also says something generally to the global issues of the soldier in 
politics in the past and present. Contemporary critics in the United States toward 
Germany have deplored pacifism and an emphasis on civil power, without, however, any 
fundamental understanding of the soldier and politics in the past and its legacy for the 
present. The key to Schleicher’s politics is his socialization in the German General Staff. 
The General Staff activities left a deep scar in German history, and it is doubtless 
responsible for several aspects of Germany’s current domestic and foreign politics. Thus, 
an understanding of the role of the military and its activities in Prussia and Germany in 
the late 19th century and in the first three decades of the 20th century relates clearly to 
the reluctance of today’s German population and political leaders with regard to military 
engagements. 
The outsized influence of the military in governmental decision-making processes 
as well as the problems of a young democracy with an authoritarian and militarist legacy 
resulted in a national and global disaster caused by Germany. This problem is of much 
wider relevance, granted the role of soldiers of politics in the present, and challenges to 
                                                 
6 Erich Matthias, “The Downfall of the Old Social Democratic Party in 1933,” in Republic to Reich - 
The Making of the Nazi Revolution, ed. Hajo Holborn (New York: Pantheon Books, Division of Random 
House, 1972), 80. 
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and in democratic governance in a time of emergency. If the military gets too intensively 
involved in political affairs, there will be a higher risk that the use of force will not 
remain a last resort, an ultima ratio. The deformation of the key institutions of state and 
politics that lead to militarization, authoritarianism, and illiberalism is much likelier to 
ensue, as a result. 
C. A BROAD SPECTRUM OF SCHOLARSHIP 
The classical literature, written in an attempt to explain the failings of the Weimar 
Republic in the 1950s, retains enduring value. Gordon Craig’s The Politics of the 
Prussian Army provides an excellent understanding of the role of the General Staff in 
Prussia and Germany. His comprehensive analysis will be an essential fundament to 
explain Schleicher’s socialization whose life was formed by military means from the 
early beginning. Craig offers a convincing explanation why the General Staff deeply 
believed that it was a unique and the most relevant element in Germany’s governmental 
affairs. Furthermore, he proves the tragic misunderstanding that these officers had with 
regard to their role while serving their fatherland (Vaterland). 
In the History of the German General Staff, Walter Goerlitz describes in more 
detail the internal activities, structures, and players in Schleicher’s time and place. He 
shows that a group of German officers, among them Schleicher and Groener, later 
minister of defense (Reichswehrminister) and minister of the interior, early started to 
consolidate and to increase the influence of the military in governmental affairs. 
The German historian Thilo Vogelsang shows that Schleicher and Groener 
understood the military as a unique political tool and that both played a key role by 
underestimating Hitler and the Nazi movement. They aimed on enlarging the military’s 
competences for governmental affairs, but they eventually never reached their political 
goals. Weakening the young democracy was their highest priority.7 Vogelsang’s book 
offers a major fundament to describe Schleicher’s early socialization. Therefore, it is an 
                                                 
7 Thilo Vogelsang, Kurt von Schleicher—ein General als Politiker (Göttingen, Frankfurt, Zürich: 
Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1965), 48–71. 
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essential piece to understand the background for his political goals and his later 
governance as German Chancellor. Furthermore, he describes in detail Schleicher’s 
relationship to Groener, which developed to become a keystone of politics in the Weimar 
Republic. Another author who broadly describes Schleicher’s character and his 
relationship to Groener comprehensively is Theodor Eschenburg.  
Goerlitz also proves that anti-democratic attitudes had a long-term tradition in the 
German military, particularly in the General Staff. The officer corps was dominated by 
members of the nobility like the so-called Junkers. On the whole, these people did not 
believe in democratic ideals but in the legitimate power of the imperial Hohenzollern 
family and their designated role as the nation’s elite. The Junkers also feared that in a 
democratic environment, they could significantly lose influence in governmental affairs. 
Helmut von Moltke, who became chief of the Prussian General Staff in 1857, clearly 
expressed his anti-democratic attitudes.8 
Furthermore, Goerlitz offers an explanation of why the General Staff had 
developed its elitist understanding and had created its own world concerning political 
realities, ideals, and circumstances. A great source on these civil-military relations is also 
the edition Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs Bänden 1648–1939, which provides a 
comprehensive picture with regard to the significant role of the military in Germany’s 
governmental affairs. This edition also shows how the German military permanently tried 
to prevent social democratic influences within the forces. For example, the German 
emperor supported the officers through prohibiting in 1910 that social policy was 
discussed in military classes.9 
Henry Ashby Turner’s Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power is a cornerstone to 
reconstruct the turbulent weeks when the chancellorship turned from Schleicher to Hitler 
                                                 
8 Walter Goerlitz, History of The German General Staff 1657–1945 (New York, London: Fredrick A. 
Plaeger, 5th printing, 1964), 74. 
9 Wiegand Schmidt-Richberg. “Die Regierungszeit Wilhelms II.” Deutsche Militärgeschichte in sechs 
Bänden 1618–1939: Von der Entlassung Bismarcks bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs 1890 - 1918, Band 
3, Abschnitt V, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (München: Bernhard & Graefe Verlag, 1983), 
115. 
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in January 1933. He comprehensively describes how Schleicher’s goal to divide the Nazi 
party—the so-called Querfront-Politik—failed, and he eventually became a victim of his 
own political activities. Schleicher’s view of Hitler was a fatal misjudgment with tragic 
consequences. 
Geoffrey P. Megargee’s book Inside Hitler’s High Command mainly analyzes the 
time after Kurt von Schleicher’s chancellorship, but it provides essential arguments to 
understand that the military elite in the Weimar Republic was focused on military 
technical aspects. These people were no politicians, but, bureaucrats. In this context, 
Michael Howard’s War in European History is also helpful for its general insights into 
the epoch of total war. 
Two books by the German scholar Irene Strenge provide a recent view on the 
events in Berlin in the winter of 1932–1933. In Machtübernahme—Alles auf legalem 
Weg?, she describes how conservative politicians paved the way for Hitler’s dictatorship. 
The Ermächtigungsgesetz (enabling law), which formed the political fundament of the 
Nazi party’s total power, was an idea of conservative elites in the Weimar Republic. 
Schleicher saw the state of emergency (Staatsnotstand) as an appropriate and legitimate 
tool for political circumstances he considered exceptional and dire. He intentionally 
planned to weaken parliamentarianism, which he saw as the heart of the republic’s 
problem. This book highlights Schleicher’s anti-democratic attitude and his lacking 
respect with regard to the Weimar Republic’s constitution.10 
Strenge’s second book, Kurt von Schleicher—Politik im Reichswehrministerium 
am Ende der Weimarer Republik, is an essential source to analyze Schleicher’s role as 
German Chancellor and to show his failure as soldier in politics, but it lacks information 
about his earlier career and his socialization in the German military as well as in the 
General Staff. Strenge shows that Schleicher developed his political ambitions very early. 
On 20 December 1918 he—holding the rank of major—explained them to General Staff 
officers. First, he aimed on a re-implementation of Germany’s governmental power and 
                                                 
10 Irene Strenge, Machtübernahme 1933—Alles auf legalem Weg? (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
2002), 107–114. 
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authority; in his view a strong Reichspräsident with a strong military. His second goal 
was the reconstruction of the economy, and finally he saw the need to reconstitute 
Germany’s military power as instrument for foreign affairs. All his following military 
and political activities focused on these ambitions. This is one reason why the Weimar 
Republic failed.11 Strenge’s main thesis is that Schleicher eventually committed political 
suicide, because he had a completely wrong understanding of the strategic situation. He 
weakened his own position in favor of the Reichspräsident.12 
Louis Leo Snyder sees Schleicher as perpetual source of political instability in the 
Weimar Republic, since he “had been instrumental in intrigues leading to the making and 
the fall of cabinets.”13 Samuel William Halperin supports this thesis: Eventually, 
Schleicher’s several intrigues and his conspiracy talks to Hindenburg lead to his complete 
isolation and failure.14 As a revenge for an intrigue, which brought von Schleicher into 
office as chancellor, his predecessor Franz von Papen used an intrigue with Hitler to 
downfall him. Eventually, “Schleicher … saw himself threatened by this high-powered 
conspiracy, appealed to the President for permission to dissolve the Reichstag. … 
Hindenburg refused and thereby forced Schleicher into a position where he could do 
nothing but resign.”15 Karl Dietrich Bracher comes to the same conclusion: “It soon 
became apparent that Schleicher’s enemies had not been idle; through the initiative of a 
handful of key persons, new alternatives opened up which brought down Schleicher and 
with him the last hopes for preventing a Nazi takeover.”16 
To comprehensively understand Hindenburg’s and Groener’s role in World War I 
as well as in the Weimar Republic’s politics the biographic books by Johannes Hürter and 
Wolfram Pyta, are essential. Pyta offers a newer and more critical view on the former 
                                                 
11 Irene Strenge, Kurt von Schleicher, 16–20. 
12 Ibid., 226–227. 
13 Louis Leo Snyder, The Weimar Republic—A History of Germany from Ebert to Hitler (Princeton, 
Toronto, London, New York: D. van Nostrand Company, 1966), 96. 
14 Samuel William Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy - A Political History of the Reich From 1918 
to 1933 (Connecticut, Hamdon, London: Archon Books, reprint from 1963), 480–485. 
15 Richard Grunberger, Germany 1918–1945 (London: B.T. Batsford 1964), 93. 
16 Bracher, The German Dictatorship, 200. 
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president’s activities.17 Similar to Schleicher, Hindenburg and Groener were generals in 
politics and significantly influenced by their socialization in the General Staff. Their 
socialization and their political activities, however, need to be seen with a broader 
perspective. Ursula Büttner offers a comprehensive analysis of Germany’s political, 
economic, and social situation after World War I. The severe suffering of the 
population—millions of men killed, handicapped, or wounded in war; hundreds of 
thousands people starving; in January 1918 major strikes in the German defense industry 
occurred although the nation was war-fighting—was a major source for the heavy 
repercussions Germany faced.18 
Eberhard Kolb and Dirk Schumann emphasize that Weimar was an improvised 
democracy without being deep-rooted in the German population’s minds.19 They also 
show that the Treaty of Versailles brought, on the one hand, bitter results for Germany. 
On the hand, the nation could retain its status as great European power.20 Sebastian 
Haffner also emphasizes that Germany’s strategic situation after World War I was even 
better than before 1914. It was not anymore encircled by four great powers: Austria-
Hungary, England, France, and Russia. Austria-Hungary did not exist anymore. Russia 
became the Soviet Union, distanced itself from European politics, and, eventually, 
became a military partner of Germany. The government in Paris was concerned how to 
contain 70 million German neighbors with a French population of 40 million.21 
                                                 
17 Based on recent research results concerning Hindenburg’s antidemocratic attitude, the city of 
Münster decided in February 2012 to change the name of a central square from Hindenburgplatz to 
Schlossplatz. An intense public debate and initiatives followed, and a plebiscite was the consequence. On 
16 September 2012, nearly 60 percent of the city’s population voted against a renaming of the place after 
the former president. (Stadt Münster, “Hindenburgplatz,” 
http://www.muenster.de/stadt/strassennamen/hindenburg.html, accessed May 29, 2013.) 
18 Ursula Büttner, Weimar—Die überforderte Republik 1918–1933—Leistung und Versagen in Staat, 
Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Kultur (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008), 21–30. 
19 Eberhard Kolb and Dirk Schumann, Die Weimarer Republik, 8th ed. (München: Oldenbourg, 2013), 
1. 
20 Ibid., 29–36. 
21 Sebastian Haffner, Von Bismarck zu Hitler—Ein Rückblick (München: Knaur Taschenbuch Verlag, 
2009), 180–182. 
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Hans Mommsen’s analysis is essential to understand the developments in 
Germany between the two World Wars, and Hans Delbrück’s observations allow a 
hermeneutic view on the nation’s repercussions. Mary Fulbrook’s analysis The Divided 
Nation—A History of Germany 1918–1990 is an essential source, concluding that “certain 
army leaders, notably Schleicher, did their best to undermine democracy and replace it 
with some form of authoritarian state … .”22 
The thesis is a historical and biographical study, and the author’s supreme goal 
was to use the broadest available spectrum of historical and recent sources. A main focus 
was to analyze Schleicher’s military socialization and the role of the German General 
Staff in political affairs. Unfortunately, most of Schleicher’s personal documents were 
destroyed after he was murdered by the Nazis. Moreover, Schleicher’s favor for 
conspiracy let him usually prevent to use or keep written documents.23 Nevertheless, 
today a broad picture of his governance is possible. The Germany’s federal archive 
(Bundesarchiv) provides several governmental documents, which allow a comprehensive 
view on Schleicher’s chancellorship. They show, for example, an unduly powerful 
Reichspräsident who permanently intervened in daily political business. Furthermore, 
these documents prove that Schleicher completely underestimated the critical political 
situation and the threat that occurred from Hitler’s movement. These primary sources 
allow an unbiased view, and they are essential to analyze Schleicher’s governmental 
activities.24 
D. TWO STORY LINES: GERMANY’S POLITICS AND SCHLEICHER’S 
WORLD 
To understand Schleicher’s political activities an analysis of two major aspects is 
appropriate. On the one hand, the situation and the developments in Germany after 1848 
played a significant role and set the historical framework. The nation faced a perpetual 
                                                 
22 Mary Fulbrook, The Divided Nation—A History of Germany 1918–1990 (New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 358. 
23 Irene Strenge, Kurt von Schleicher, 14. 
24 Das Bundesarchiv, “Das Kabinett von Schleicher (1932/33),” 
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suppression of democracy by its elites, especially the military. Bismarck’s German 
unification through warfare paved the way for a distinct nationalism and militarism, 
enhanced by the birth of mass politics. Imperial Germany experienced an enormous 
upswing in its industrial production, including new political movements as well as 
dramatic economic and social changes. World War I left Germany in poverty, and the 
war’s consequences led to dramatic repercussions. The Weimar Republic’s early years 
were rife with hyper-inflation and bitter conditions for the people. After a brief—and 
illusory—period of relative stability and limited gains, the global economic crisis after 
1929 demolished even this modest democratic consolidation—and fostered the political 
radicalism that Hitler made possible. All these developments formed Schleicher’s world, 
and, indeed, they significantly influenced him. 
On the other hand, his micro-world has to be analyzed, too. Schleicher’s 
childhood, military education, serving in the General Staff, experiences in World War I, 
as well as in the Weimar Republic contributed to the general’s decision to become a 
politician. Step by step, he increased his influence in political affairs, but he retained the 
mindset, behavior, and attitude of a military technocrat. Eventually, Schleicher insinuated 
himself into the very center of political power in Germany, including contacts to well-
known key players like Hitler, Hindenburg, Papen, and Ludendorff. His strengths and his 
weaknesses colored his political career and its ignoble end. Thus, the soldier in politics 
Kurt von Schleicher both stars in and embodies the larger story of the disastrous activities 
of the German General Staff in imperial Germany and in the Weimar Republic. 
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II. MASS POLITICS AND THE SOLDIER IN GERMANY AFTER 
1848: AN AUTHORITARIAN MODERNIZATION 
Schleicher’s socialization as a citizen and an officer and his activities as politician 
in the Weimar Republic are deeply rooted in Germany’s political, social, and economic 
developments in the second half of the 19th century. That is, Schleicher was born into a 
certain German political mindset that developed after 1848, in particular the failure of 
Germany’s liberal revolution, which neither sought nor accepted a victory of liberal ideas 
and goals. Instead, the prevailing cultural and political forces came to be dominated by an 
old aristocracy oriented toward a fabled past. “Order” equated to the undisputed primacy 
of this class, even as the new industrial elite drove the German economy to the leading 
edge of modernity—in methods if not in social effect. Indeed, German society and—after 
unification in 1871—the German nation became steadily more authoritarian, anti-liberal, 
and militaristic. In all, these four broad developments—the perpetual suppression by anti-
liberal forces of democracy; Germany’s 19th-century unification through war; the 
consolidation of power in state and society after 1871; as well as the character of German 
society, economy, and industrialization in the epoch from 1870 until 1918—exercised 
characteristic influences on Schleicher and his generation with particularly fatal 
consequences for the 20th century. 
A. THE PERPETUAL SUPPRESSION OF DEMOCRACY 
While Germany’s 19th century liberal-national movements led to the foundation 
of a strong national state, they failed to foster the political culture and the institutions of 
checks and balances and civil society. Similar politics gripped other continental European 
states like Austria-Hungary and Russia: “The danger of liberal-national revolution 
cemented the ties between the autocratic Powers and, until the year of revolution (1848), 
all three Powers presented a united front against the spread of liberal ideas or institutions 
within their dominions.”25 In this regard, the road to German national unity diverged 
                                                 
25 Earnest James Passant, A Short History of Germany 1815–1945 (London, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1959), 22. 
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significantly inform the model of Britain and France for instance. In the end, the 
backward-looking elites successfully suppressed the spread of liberal ideas and 
aspirations beginning in 1819, again in 1848, also in 1862, and, most especially, in the 
years after 1871 until 1918. 
In a word, the problem was Prussia. The basically right-wing and conservative 
Prussia—dominated by the feudal landowning nobility, the Junkers, and ruled through an 
effective but absolutistic bureaucracy—did not embrace the liberal-national movements, 
which aimed on implementing the French Revolution’s ideals in a German (rather than 
strictly Prussian) context. After the March revolutions in 1848, with the goal of national 
unity and a constitutional monarchy, a kind of German government eventuated in the 
industrializing west, including a parliament in the Paulskirche of Frankfurt-am-Main. In 
response to external political pressure from both Austria and Russia, the parliament 
sought to bring Prussia into the compact for the sake of its considerable size and fighting 
power—even if this kind of union would dilute or delay the more ambitious liberal 
agenda of the more westerly (and Western) partners.26 There was also the matter of 
Prussia’s administrative capabilities, which seemed vital to the consolidation of power in 
a new German state, because “[h]er government, if autocratic, was at least efficient, and 
her bureaucrats, however much disliked, commanded respect by their thoroughness and 
freedom from corruption.”27 When, by the end of the momentous year 1848, the Prussian 
king bestowed a much watered-down constitution on his subjects as a gift, any pretenses 
of genuine democracy vanished as surely as the liberals of the so-called Forty-Eighter 
generation, who emigrated in droves. 
The predominance of Prussia in the unification process also changed the nature of 
the project in a fundamental way, as Prussia preferred a “small German” solution. Earlier 
visions called for the unification of all German peoples—including, for example, the 
Austrians—but this “greater Germany” necessarily would include populations of non-
Germans who lived in Habsburg lands. According to the British historian Richard Evans, 
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“the liberals had correctly decided that there was no chance of Germany uniting … in a 
nation-state that included German-speaking Austria. That would have meant the break-up 
of the Hapsburg monarchy, which included huge swathes of territory … that lay outside 
the German Confederation, and included many millions of people who spoke languages 
other than German.”28 That is, the Paulskirche could not adjudicate the fate of Czechs 
and Hungarians successfully in addition to the problem of legitimacy of power in the 
state. So while Prussia was in, Austria was out of the new ideal of unification. 
Thus, Germany took shape with little more than a veneer of constitutionalism on a 
state, including its bureaucracy and its army that had little use for liberalization. With 
regard to domestic politics, no major changes occurred, because “[i]n alliance with the 
Junkers, the system of local government in the countryside was restored to the situation 
before 1850, under which the landowners exercised a feudal jurisdiction, whilst 
prosecutions against intellectuals and politicians were supported by the perjured evidence 
of political agents.”29 
Perhaps the most central figure in this time and place was Otto von Bismarck 
(1815–1898), who unified Germany under Prussia’s leadership and both embodied and 
embedded these trends in the new state. Eventually, “it was to be Bismarck’s triumph to 
turn … liberal-nationalism into a national-liberalism in which the liberal idea was to be 
subordinated to the ambitions of conservative Prussia to unite and dominate Germany.”30 
In the view of Bracher, Bismarck started—after the failure of the 1848 democratic 
revolution—a domestic “conservative-national revolution from above.”31 For example, 
“[t]he upper house was changed into a house of landlords, and many of the members 
were appointed by the [Prussian] king. The Bürgerwehr [militia] was abolished and the 
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principle of a standing army reaffirmed. The oath to the colours (Fahneneid) replaced the 
oath to the constitution.”32 
As Howard notes: “The middle class radicals of the 1820s and 30s … were 
certainly revolutionary in 1848, and continued to constitute a troublesome opposition in 
the 1850s. But Bismarck drew their sting by persuading the Prussian monarchy to 
espouse the cause of German nationalism and in 1871 they shouted Hoch dem Kaiser! as 
loudly as anyone.”33 
Bismarck could rely on the support of military elites in any and all measures to 
suppress liberalism. Field Marshal Edwin von Manteuffel, for instance—who was one of 
the king’s most influential military advisors—”was an unwavering absolutist and, in his 
mind, the greatest mistake ever made by the Prussian monarchy had been its decision to 
grant a constitution to the Prussian people.”34 While the constitution could not be entirely 
un-granted, the Prussian German leaders of Manteuffel’s time did their utmost to ensure 
that little, if any, liberalization took hold in their empire. 
B. GERMANY’S UNIFICATION THROUGH WAR 
According to Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck implemented a double-track 
strategy. Domestically, he antagonized liberals through repression, imprisonment, as well 
as limiting the freedom of press. At the same time, the chancellor understood the 
influence of a muscular foreign policy as a means to strengthen the monarchy and prevent 
an increase of liberal momentum35—foreign adventures rallied most factions to the 
national cause most of the time. As such, under Bismarck’s political leadership in the era 
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from 1862 until 1871, Prussia and her German allies fought three wars to consolidate 
German territory and borders as well as to build a unified nation. 
1. Setting the Stage with Denmark and Austria 
In the first war of unification, an Austrian-Prussian coalition defeated Denmark. 
After the Danish armistice on 20 July 1864 and the signing of the final term on 
27 October 1884, three strategically important duchies36 came under the joint, but not 
combined, governance of Berlin and Vienna. This situation was, however, solely a 
temporary answer, because “[t]he question of the ultimate disposal of these territories had 
now to be decided. The condominium of the two German Great Powers was unlikely to 
prove a satisfactory permanent solution.”37 
Bismarck cunningly paved the way for a war about the German ascendancy 
between Austria and Prussia through an expertly balanced scheme of domestic and 
international politics of violence and limits to statecraft. Eventually, he successfully 
provoked “Austria to such degree that she would provide a casus belli and thus persuade 
[the reluctant Prussian] King William that she, and not Prussia, was the aggressor.”38 
Prussia defeated Austria and could significantly increase as well as unite its so far 
fragmented territories. One consequence of the war with Austria was the implementation 
of the North German Confederation (Norddeutscher Bund). Within this alliance, Prussia’s 
leadership was unquestionable: “Prussia herself had after the 1866 annexations 24 million 
inhabitants, all other 22 members … together six [million].”39 With regard to civil-
military relations of the era, it is remarkable that “at the very outset of hostilities against 
Austria, on June 1866, a royal cabinet order stated that from now on, the commands of 
the [Prussian] General Staff would be communicated directly to the troops and no longer 
                                                 
36 Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig. 
37 Passant, Germany 1815–1945, 52. 
38 Ibid., 55. 
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through the mediation of the War Ministry.”40 Moreover, “[w]ithin the North German 
Confederation there was no minister of war, and thus no constitutional link between the 
army and the Reichstag. Thus the king of Prussia as supreme commander was in an even 
stronger position than he was in Prussia itself.”41 
Moreover, “Bismarck’s victory over Austria was also a victory over the forces of 
liberalism in Prussia.”42 This second victory came by design: “Bismarck had entered the 
fray to put an end once and for all to attacks by the liberal opposition who were 
attempting to transform the authoritarian state into a parliamentary democracy … .”43  
In his function as Prussian minister president and the North German Confederation’s 
chancellor, Bismarck unambiguously demonstrated his favor for royal power and his 
skepticism with regard to parliamentarianism: “[H]e made it clear that neither he nor the 
king admitted the principle of the responsibility of ministers to the elected house and he 
asserted the right, and even the duty, of the Crown to act independently if a parliamentary 
deadlock occurred.”44 Earnest James Passant concludes: “After 1866 there was no further 
progress towards fully responsible parliamentary government in Prussia until the collapse 
of 1918.”45 
2. The Main Event: France 
The real prize for Bismarck was France, which would have to be defeated “if 
German unity were to be completed.”46 Even though France’s self-made emperor, 
Napoleon III, had, in the years since 1851, taken the country well afield of the liberal 
ideals of the Tennis Court Oath, Paris would still object to a fortified and unified 
Germany for pure power-political reasons. To obviate any threat from the western border, 
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“[f]rom 1866 to 1870 the strategic planning of the [German] General Staff was devoted to 
working out the details of an offensive against France.”47 
At the same time, the Prussian General Staff emerged as a political and military 
innovation of the 19th century, a body of military expertise with its own increasing 
political prerogatives, which did or did not fit into the overall goals of statecraft. This 
innovation represents a significant aspect of this story of the soldier in politics, that is, 
that soldiers therewith acquired a role in the political life of a nation that they had never 
had previous in quite the same way. 
The General Staff’s chief, Moltke, building on the momentum of the earlier wars, 
“saw a war against France as the ideal chance to unify Germany under Prussia in a way 
that would necessitate few concessions to liberalism or democracy.”48 His antidemocratic 
attitude, a legacy of 1848 and the opinions of his social caste, was clear at an early stage 
shaped by the experience of revolution in Europe from 1789 until 1848: Already in 1850, 
Moltke “wrote to his brother that the curtain had come down on Prussia’s worst enemy, 
democracy.”49 
Haffner, however, shows that Bismarck was quite reluctant with respect to 
unforeseeable military adventures, which could cause a potential catastrophe for the 
young and fragile German state. The chancellor carefully prioritized the nation’s 
consolidation, and he had no desire for a war that would overturn the European system so 
crucial to a stable order in which Germany would emerge dominant. The fast-paced 
incidents in July 1870 that led to war between France and the North German 
Confederation—in particular the French-Prussian struggle over the successor for the 
vacant Spanish throne—surprised him.50 Still, this unanticipated development did not 
stop Bismarck from provoking a diplomatic escalation, and, eventually, the French 
government declared war on Prussia on 19 July 1870. 
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During the Franco-Prussian war, the civil-military struggles became more obvious 
than in the years before. A significantly higher number of soldiers—” [b]y the first week 
of August the total German mobilization was 1.183 million men. The maximum French 
mobilized strength at the same time, was 567,000”51—and superiority with regard to 
planning, tactics, and leadership guaranteed that “the outcome of the Franco-Prussian war 
was never in doubt.”52 
Bismarck and Moltke had widely different conceptions about whether the 
chancellor or the chief of the General Staff should lead during wartime. On the one hand, 
Moltke was convinced that “once a war began, the politician must step into the 
background and leave all aspects of warmaking [sic] to military leaders.”53 Bismarck, on 
the other hand, “discovered that the army leaders had a tendency to regard war as a 
province in which alone they had competence, that they were reluctant to admit that the 
civilian ministers had any authority to influence the course of operations and that they 
were dangerously willing, in the name of military expediency, to disregard important 
considerations of international diplomacy.”54 Eventually, Bismarck enforced the primacy 
of civil leadership in political affairs, and the German victory advanced his goal to 
further consolidate Germany under Prussian hegemony. 
C. CONSOLIDATION OF POWER AFTER 1871 
On 18 January 1871, the proclamation of the German Reich occurred in 
Versailles, and the Prussian King Wilhelm I (1797–1888) became German emperor. He 
did not preside over a republic with a distinct parliamentarianism but a federal monarchy 
under Prussia’s dominance, where “[e]ven the intellectuals saw themselves as soldiers. 
As [Prussian] Professor Du Bois-Reymond proclaimed in 1870: ‘The University of Berlin 
… is the spiritual Household Regiment of the house of Hohenzollern … Historians are … 
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the Mamelukes of Prussian politics.’”55 Nationalistic sentiments rose, and many Germans 
“understood 1870 as revenge for the Napoleonic wars of conquest in the first ten years of 
the 19th century.”56 The military became a key symbol for the German unification and 
strength, and “[a]s a result many liberals were prepared to silence their criticisms of the 
military, ignore their democratic aspirations and devote most of their time and energy to 
making money.”57 
The civil-military tensions that accompanied the foundation of the Second Reich 
persisted, as well, though it first appeared as a personality conflict more than anything 
else. Moltke, “was never able completely to reconcile himself to … elementary laws of 
statesmanship[,]”58 while his rival Bismarck “understood more clearly than most 
statesmen and officers of his era the overriding relevance of political considerations for 
every level of military activity.”59 In sum, the chief of the General Staff was a military 
technocrat, and because he was “accustomed to thinking in terms of pure strategy and to 
drawing up plans of almost mathematical exactitude, he was irritated by the disruption of 
his calculations by unpleasant political realities.”60 According to Marcus Jones, the 
chancellor viewed politics neither as arithmetic nor as mathematics. Bismarck perpetually 
considered political consequences, and “his most pronounced feature as a strategic actor 
was his moderation and prudence. Bismarck never set his country on a course that his 
mind had not cautiously explored beforehand.”61 The chancellor understood that political 
success cannot be comprehensively preplanned and that politics have to be adapted 
perpetually. Therefore, his “great genius as the founder of a Prussian-dominated German 
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nation lay not in his adherence to a systematic program or plan but in his expert 
navigation of uncertain events through intuition and broad experience.”62 
However, Moltke’s view reached more of Germany’s leaders because the General 
Staff served as the incubator for many of the Second Reich’s leading statesmen. For one 
signal example, before he acceded to the throne, Wilhelm II (1859–1941) was for a 
period of time assigned to Germany’s foreign office that Bismarck led from 1871 until 
his dismissal in 1890. Wilhelm failed utterly to grasp Bismarck’s approach to leading 
Germany.63 He had joined the German army at the age of 17; he was 29 when he became 
emperor, by which time he clearly preferred military attitudes and approaches even 
though he was not a full-time soldier. Wilhelm clearly favored the recommendations of 
military technocrats who were significantly influenced by their socialization in the 
General Staff. 
Not surprisingly, then, the new emperor, crowned in 1888, strengthened the 
army’s influence in political affairs. “One of William’s first steps after ascending the 
throne was to expand and reorganize the royal mission militaire and to give it the name 
royal headquarters … .”64 The emperor’s absolutistic attitude and his skepticism with 
respect to the constitution was obvious, and he “was always more intimate with members 
of his suite [of assigned adjutants and generals] than he was with responsible ministers of 
state.”65 Imbued with Moltke’s skepticism, the army had successfully assured its status as 
essential political element, including significant influence in foreign and domestic 
political affairs. 
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Bismarck observed these developments critically. For instance, after the chief of 
the imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Alfred von Waldersee, had informed Austria 
that it had no reason to fear a Russian offensive, “Bismarck … complained—and that not 
unreasonably—of this interference of the General Staff in diplomatic affairs.”66 The field 
marshal began to use his military attaché system for his foreign political goals and 
activities, separate from traditional diplomatic procedures. Eventually, Waldersee 
convinced Wilhelm II, and the aging chancellor perpetually lost influence. Finally, the 
emperor—”who shared the general’s belief in the superiority of military to civilian 
intelligence”67—dismissed Bismarck in 1890. 
A contemporary political cartoon in Britain’s Punch magazine famously 
characterized Bismarck’s firing as “dropping the pilot.” But what about the German ship 
of state? A new German era began, but—with a 21st century view—the preconditions 
were not promising, because Bismarck’s “long tenure as Reichskanzler left in its wake a 
constitutional structure ill suited [SIC] to responsible stewardship of Germany’s growing 
power, a political system infantilized by his condescending leadership style, and a nation 
steeped in admiration of military achievement.”68 Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890 was 
probably the main step from Prussian-monarchic to militaristic Germany. According to 
Samuel W. Mitcham, Germany “was … on her last legs militarily. She had been 
diplomatically outmaneuvered almost constantly since … Wilhelm II removed … 
Bismarck.”69 Moreover, “[t]he turning away from Bismarck’s program with regard to 
foreign affairs in the 1890s, initiated a paradigm change in foreign and military 
politics.”70 More precisely, the outsized influence of the military in governmental 
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affairs—with all fatal and tragic consequences—became a political, social, and economic 
key factor in Germany. 
D. SOCIETY, ECONOMY, AND INDUSTRIALIZATION 
While German politics in the late 19th century focused on maintaining the status 
quo of Prussian power—beneath the seeming stability, if not stolidity—momentous 
social and economic changes fizzed and popped with all the energy of the so-called 
second Industrial Revolution. On the one hand, all over in Europe “[t]he daily lives of 
great masses of people were radically changed, and time-honoured ties, myths and 
loyalties faded away.”71 On the other hand, in comparison with England and France, 
Germany came late to industrialization, but once Germany started, industrialization and 
development proceeded at a breathtaking pace. Not only did Germany catch up to the 
world’s leaders in such classic heavy industrial production as coal and steel—thanks, in 
part, to availing itself of the newest technologies and techniques—but it made itself 
important in such new sectors as chemicals and electricity. 
From the very beginning, this industrialization followed a top-down-approach. 
With the state’s support and blessing, major banks, large enterprises, syndicates, trusts, as 
well as cartels arose, and eventually, a few men controlled Germany’s economy.72 This 
circumstance meant that the rise of these very few and very wealthy capitalists more or 
less precluded the rise of the wider middle class either economically or politically. 
Indeed, “[i]t remains a fact that the broad fundament of middle class entrepreneurship 
played a minor role during the German industrialization than large economic formations 
and their leaders.”73 Moreover, in Wehler’s view, the German Bürgertum did not develop 
the English desire for political participation and liberalism. Rather, it developed feudal 
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aims as well as behaviors and copied attitudes of the nobility.74 In the end, a powerful 
German middle class with the potential to call for democratic reforms and to counter the 
royal family’s and nobility’s claim to power did not exist. 
At the same time, the German society was also significantly influenced by an 
increase of militarism. To be sure, the militarization of society was not exclusively a 
German phenomenon, because “[b]y the end of the nineteenth century European society 
was militarized to a very remarkable degree.”75 Germany’s authoritarian system and its 
elites, though, were essential to the increase in the militaristic spirit of the time 
(Zeitgeist). Large segments of German society were infected, and in the context of “[t]he 
attitudes towards life and culture of Wilhelminismus, the military played a central role. 
The ‘hurrah-patriotism’ … saw in the lieutenant the ideal of society that aspired towards 
the realization of Nationalism and Imperialism.”76 
In addition, the conservative middle class understood “the upcoming labor 
movements, organized in Germany’s Social Democratic Party and in labor unions, as 
internal enemy.”77 The ideal of German patriarchic family structures became symbolic as 
key to success for an ascendant industrialized Germany.78 It was not the desire for 
liberalism but the belief in absolutistic and militaristic behavior that the middle class 
demonstrated. Therefore, Germany’s epoch of industrialization, the Gründerzeit (1871–
1890), did not witness the same increasing power of the parliament and the people as, for 
example, in Victorian Britain. 
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Right-wing political actors saw their opportunity to increase political power 
through mass politics, and they successfully campaigned on nationalist platforms as a 
means to engage a larger voting public as part of the age. These actors spread the idea 
that Germany had to fight to gain her rightful position in global power politics. Admiral 
Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1939), for instance, the deputy naval minister in Germany’s 
admiralty, garnered 1.1 million members79 for his fleet association (Flottenverein) by 
1913.80 Typical of mass mobilization in the age of imperialism at the end of the 19th 
century, this association aimed at strengthening German global military ambitions 
through the buildup of a powerful fleet with a durable domestic political base. 
Tirpitz’ influence in governmental affairs was extraordinary: London’s offer to 
end the naval arms race between England and Germany—the Haldane Mission in 1912—
was in favor of the then-functioning German chancellor Theobald von Bethmann 
Hollweg, but it failed by imperial decision after Tirpitz’ intervention.81 Again, the 
emperor preferred military over political advice. 
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III. AN EXAMPLARY OFFICER’S CAREER:  
KURT VON SCHLEICHER’S POLITICAL AND MILITARY 
SOCIALIZATION IN IMPERIAL GERMANY 
Schleicher’s childhood, youth, education, and career were thoroughly steeped in 
the military of the transition from the Wilhelmine epoch to the era of total war. Indeed, 
when he joined the military by the end of the 19th century, the army played a key role in 
the German public life. The military’s brain, the General Staff, had the status of national 
elite. Its leaders and members set themselves to subjects well beyond military questions 
in mass politics; they became significantly involved in international as well as domestic 
politics and economics.82 Once war came in 1914, along with such leading figures as 
Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and Groener, Schleicher became a member of this elite—and 
elitist—circle, and his skills, his good connections, as well as his ambition allowed him to 
increase steadily his military and political influence.  
The General Staff and Schleicher’s mentors socialized him in the spirit of the 
military technocrats of the epoch of total war. Step by step, these technocrats gained 
overwhelming power in Germany’s political affairs: “Operational plans for future wars 
were adopted … in a form which seriously limited the diplomatic freedom of the state … 
.”83 Moreover, “the military advisers of the Crown argued that civilian statesmen had 
neither the technical knowledge nor the realistic approach which the Zeitgeist 
required.”84 The officer—and increasingly the politician—Kurt von Schleicher deeply 
believed in the military’s superiority over civilian attitudes and the cacophony of 
conflicted interests. 
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A. THE WORLD OF KURT VON SCHLEICHER 
Kurt Ferdinand Friedrich Hermann von Schleicher was born in the Prussian city 
of Brandenburg an der Havel on 7 April 1882—the same year that, on the one hand, saw 
the first electric street lights in Berlin and, on the other hand, saw Kaiser Wilhelm I 
proclaim that the direction of government politics was his personal prerogative.  
Germany’s elite circles of nobility, officers, and industrialists accepted the 
emperor’s legitimacy and, moreover, they initiated political strategies that made all of 
them winners—at the specific cost of the broader middle classes and their liberal 
inclinations. The nobility, the Junkers, could retain their economic role as well as their 
political dominance in the rural agrarian areas; the officers successfully strengthened 
their political influence and increased the size of the forces; and the industrialists 
benefitted from large public contracts, especially for the military.  
Schleicher’s father was an officer, and his mother descended from a distinguished 
entrepreneurial family—a social stratum that by now had become thoroughly intertwined 
with the old aristocracy. In 1778, Schleicher’s family entered the nobility and developed 
a self-conception of loyalty to Prussia, the monarchy, and Protestantism, as well as 
partially to the teachings of pietism. In 1815, Schleicher’s great-grandfather—in the 
function as commander of a Prussian Landwehr regiment—fell in the battle of Ligny 
against Napoleonic France,85 the quintessential biography of a loyal Junker. Amid his 
family’s heritage and the historic context, Schleicher had to understand imperial 
Germany as key to the success and strength of the nation—and challengers to this 
apparent order as a threat or at least a problem. 
B. THE MAKING OF AN OFFICER AND MILITARY TECHNOCRAT 
In compliance with his father’s wish, Schleicher joined the German army and 
became a lieutenant in 1900. He spent his first years as an officer in the 3rd Garde-
Regiment zu Fuß in Berlin. This regiment boasted several members who later became key 
players in Germany’s political and military affairs. For instance, Paul von Hindenburg 
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served there, as well as his son Oskar, who became Schleicher’s friend. His good 
pedigree in the guard thus landed him, from the very beginning, in like-minded company 
in the brains of the army. 
In 1910, Schleicher attended the Kriegsakademie, and, after finishing his 
education, he became a member of the imperial General Staff in 1913. In the same year 
he attained the rank of a captain. Schleicher served in the branch that dealt with such 
military planning considerations as railway systems; his branch chief was Lt. Colonel 
Wilhelm Groener. 
Schleicher established a relationship of mutual trust with Groener at a fateful 
moment on the brink of momentous civil military change. According to Johannes Hürter, 
Schleicher became Groener’s favorite student (“Lieblingsschüler”).86 He might not have 
been the likeliest candidate for this distinction. Schleicher, an enormously industrious 
officer, managed his tasks successfully, despite some deficiencies in his expertise.87 
Furthermore, Schleicher developed ideas “so quickly and abundantly that he had no time 
to think them through and test them. … He tended to express himself with imprecision, 
partly for tactical reasons but sometimes because he had not given, or did not wish to 
give, sufficient thought to the matter of which he was speaking.”88 This limited world 
view as applied to the needs of the moment as well as a shocking lack of strategic 
farsightedness played a key role in his eventual political failure. 
Germany’s decision to commence the war on 1 August 1914 expanded the role of 
the General Staff decisively. In peacetime, the staff had basically no military authority 
and functioned mainly as a planning tool. With the beginning of the war, however, its 
chief gained a unique position, including the authority to implement the operational 
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orders of the supreme commander—the emperor.89 Three generals, Hindenburg, 
Ludendorff, and Groener—leading lights in this constellation of forces—influenced 
Schleicher’s thinking, behavior, and career significantly. Schleicher’s war experience 
may have been abbreviated, but the General Staff, including its monarchic, anti-
democratic, and technocratic attitude, remained his military and spiritual home, 
fundamentally at odds with pluralistic politics especially on the Western model. 
In World War I, Schleicher served in the staff of the Generalquartiermeister—
until 1916. This staff did not exist in peacetime, either, and it was Groener’s railway 
systems branch’s responsibility to implement the Generalquartiermeister headquarters in 
1914. During this time, Schleicher gained insight into the staff’s far-ranging military 
fields of activity: supply of the army in the field as well as political, economic, and 
organizational challenges concerning Germany, its allies, and occupied territories.90 
From November 1916 until May 1917, Schleicher served in the Kriegsamt,91 the War 
Office, a new agency—implemented on 1 November 1916, responsible for war-economy 
related affairs, and led by Groener. 
Schleicher began his sole front-related mission in May 1917 as 1st General Staff 
officer in the 237th Infantry Division that operated in Galicia on the eastern front; he 
completed it in August of the same year. Thereafter, Schleicher served in the 3rd Army 
Supreme Command, led by Hindenburg and Ludendorff (and succeeded by Groener on 
29 October 1918).92 
His wartime experiences doubtless had a major influence on Schleicher’s later 
political activities. The total-war situation, which worsened as the war lasted far longer 
than anyone had predicted, in turn affected large parts of the German society: Directly 
through husbands, fathers, and sons who served in war; indirectly through the “impact on 
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the living standards and morale of every German on the home front. … The main areas of 
conflict can be roughly grouped under three headings: the manpower issue, the shortage 
of civilian goods, and the food-supply problem.”93 Furthermore—according to Hans 
Delbrück—”in Germany the lack of political leaders became evident to an almost 
incredible degree.”94 In 1918, he concluded: “In Germany we have only technical 
specialists but no one trained for political leadership.”95 Nonetheless, the military took 
control of the government, step by step as the strategic situation worsened and  
the promise of operational brilliance failed to lead to a significant result in the years 
1915–1916. 
No branch of the government or state was free of military influence, and by 1917, 
“William II was … a ‘shadow Kaiser’, [and] supreme warlord in name only.”96 Indeed, 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff functioned as heads of the German government that had 
clear characteristics of a dictatorship. As a member of the General Staff as well as of the 
3rd Army Supreme Command, Schleicher had an active part in this dictatorship, and it is 
not surprising that he viewed as natural and necessary a key role for the German military 
in governmental affairs. Now holding the rank of major since July 1918, Schleicher 
found himself increasingly involved in political affairs, after Groener assigned him to 
lead the newly formed political branch in the 3rd Army Supreme Command. This 
assignment significantly enhanced Schleicher’s access to key political players in Berlin 
just as the German cause was faltering in a fateful way.97 Eventually, Schleicher became 
Groener’s “Cardinal in politics,”98 a central figure of the military’s political activities. 
From the spring 1919 on, Schleicher belonged to Hindenburg’s inner circle of advisors, 
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including frequent official and unofficial access to one of Germany’s most powerful 
personalities.99 Some months later, the ambitious major presented his own political 
program. 
C. WORLD WAR I AND SCHLEICHER’S MENTORS 
Geoffrey Preaut Megargee understands Schleicher as one of several Prusso-
German officers who were technocrats and “came to believe that their control over events 
was greater than it really was, that they could manage a war as they could a railroad 
timetable, and that they could overcome any obstacle through sheer force of 
character.”100 
The general staff had incorrectly prepared for the total war that followed in the 
late summer of 1914 though, including the over emphasis on maneuver and decisive 
battle. Thus, World War I paved the way for Schleicher’s increasing influence and his 
political ambitions in the political chaos that eventuated from the miscalculations of staff 
officers and their attempt to master the imponderables of the expansion of war. The 
experience of the war, including the predominance of the General Staff, also shaped his 
political expectations and aims. 
1. Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff 
Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff were German soldiers in politics who 
played fateful roles in imperial Germany as well as in the Weimar Republic. Both 
generals are significantly responsible for Germany’s failure in 1918 as well as for the rise 
of Hitler’s Nazi movement and Germany’s 20th-century disaster 
As member of the 3rd Army Supreme Command, Schleicher served close to 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and there exist no indications that he ever questioned his 
loyalty to these famous generals, celebrated in 1917 and 1918 as saviors of the nation. 
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From 1916, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were on top of the German chain of 
command, because the emperor acted neither as Germany’s commander-in-chief nor as 
its civilian political leader.101 Indeed, “[t]he very basis of the Prusso-German empire, the 
power of the Kaiser as War Lord, disappeared as soon as war broke out for, as though 
distrustful of his own capacity to command, William II made little effort to control 
military policy.”102 Therefore, 1916 and 1917, Germany witnessed a competition about 
political power between the General Staff and the parliament, and “William II hovered … 
between submission to the Supreme Army Command and submission to the majority in 
the Reichstag.”103 
The casualties and shortages that the war caused brought severe suffering among 
Germany’s domestic population, and the “circumstances on the home front soon 
deteriorated. Food supplies became a problem as early as in 1915. In April 1917 the first 
major strikes occurred, a consequence of the cutting of bread rations.”104 Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff gave scant consideration to the people’s suffering in Germany, the so-called 
Heimatfront, or the difficult domestic political and economic situation. They also 
overlooked the increasing skepticism among German soldiers and civilians with respect 
to the war. As late as the summer of 1918, Hindenburg still spouted escapist optimism 
and protected Ludendorff—who was mainly responsible for the German General Staff’s 
fateful misdirection—from criticism.105 Both generals quashed every option for potential 
peace negotiations. 
Civilian chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg more or less adhered to constitutional 
prerogatives and the primacy of the political in the best sense in the face of military 
radicalization amid stalemate. For their part, Hindenburg and Ludendorff regarded the 
monarchy in general and the political power of the military in particular as endangered 
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through domestic democratic as well as socialist movements. After Bethmann-Hollweg 
tried to balance the bottom-up political pressure and introduced his ideas of political 
reform (for example, the abolition of the Prussian three-class electoral system and the 
introduction of a universal franchise) in February and April 1917, Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff regarded him as enemy. “It is not difficult to imagine the effect of these steps 
upon an officer corps which was generally conservative in its political views, which had 
long fought against the increase of parliamentary powers and which … was so fearful of 
democracy that it was already seeking to indoctrinate troops with the idea that the 
proponents of reform on the home front were as much Germany’s enemies as were her 
foreign foes.”106 Moreover, the military could count on the emperor’s support, since 
“arguments of military expediency were generally, in crucial matters, given more weight 
than political considerations.”107 Eventually, Hindenburg and Ludendorff seized the 
opportunity of the emperor’s weakness and implemented a military dictatorship of the so-
called Dritte Oberste Heeresleitung in the epoch after 1916. Thereafter, “[c]ivilian 
government broke down with the resignation of the moderate Chancellor Bethmann-
Hollweg in July 1917 … .”108 
After “the fall of the civilian Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg was engineered by 
the [army’s] High Command, the subsequent military dictatorship of Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff was supported by a powerful organization, … which represented all strata of 
society but probably drew the bulk of its support from the lower middle classes.”109 
Bethmann vainly attempted to bring about peace negotiations, and “[t]he failure of the 
Chancellor’s peace overtures weakened his prestige in governmental circles, a fact which 
was noted with satisfaction by the Supreme Command.”110 It is notable that “Bethmann 
was brought down by the right, not the left, by soldiers, not party leaders.”111 
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The 3rd Army Supreme Command functioned as German government, however, 
according to Wiegand Schmidt-Richberg, “Hindenburg was basically not of a political 
nature, [he was] just soldier, who was rooted in the monarchic-conservative views of the 
Prussian officer. Whatever foreign or domestic political problems confronted him, he 
faced them with his soldierly attitude, essentially without deeper insight in complex 
contexts.”112 Wolfram Pyta emphasizes that Hindenburg demonstrated a clear view of his 
own skills and of Germany’s domestic power-political circumstances. The field marshal 
was well aware of his lack of aptitude for managing complicated political affairs, and, 
first and foremost, he made no secret of his aversion to the parliament. Therefore, 
Hindenburg did not aim to become chancellor, because this position would have forced 
him to cooperate with constitutional elements, resulting in a limitation of his power as 
military dictator that allowed him to govern without institutional constraints. 
Furthermore, as chancellor he would have had to deal with a parliament, in which—since 
the 1912 elections—the Social Democratic Party, the (Catholic) German Center Party, 
and the left-wing Liberals had a comfortable majority. These parties’ goals differed 
significantly from Hindenburg’s political convictions.113 
Whereas Hindenburg showed a talent for self-promotion and the reputation as a 
gentleman of leisure but a lack of military-tactical understanding, Ludendorff 
demonstrated his excellent military-tactical and organizational skills, as well as his 
industry and cunning.114 In contrast to Hindenburg, who adapted himself, at least 
outwardly, to the new political circumstances, Ludendorff, instead, chose a path of 
radicalization that ended in the realm of the berserk: “He began … to search for hidden 
powers which must in some sinister way have made his perfect plans ineffective. Thus it 
was that he turned his back on the civilized tradition of his time and began those dark 
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meditations on the secret behind the secrets, the hidden powers of Jews, Freemasons and 
Jesuits.”115 These dark fears, in turn, undergirded his further political development away 
from democracy or peace. 
Although the Great War ended with Germany’s defeat and the infamous Treaty of 
Versailles, Hindenburg’s reputation did not significantly suffer in the wider public 
because of the nimbus of 1914 and the transformations of state and society of total war. 
On the one hand, the German public believed that Ludendorff was responsible for the 
mistakes during the decisive German offensive that began in March 1918 and the 
military’s failure in general. On the other hand, Hindenburg organized the return of the 
army after the war ended and the German Revolution occurred in November 1918. His 
symbolic strength, which filled a void left by the collapse of the Hohenzollerns, 
emboldened him to act as facilitator during Germany’s transition from imperial monarchy 
to republic, and his fame fulfilled the imperial desires of large parts of Germany’s 
population after the emperor had resigned.116 
To deflect or diminish their own responsibility in particular and the army’s failure 
in general, Hindenburg and Ludendorff successfully created and implemented the myth 
that domestic circumstances and not the army’s failure led to the defeat. Thus, as Mary 
Fulbrook stated, “[t]he Army High Command now felt that it would be advisable to hand 
over power to a civilian administration: Army leaders—who were already propagating 
the myth of a ‘stab in the back’, the betrayal of an undefeated Germany by Jews and 
Bolsheviks at home, an enemy within—preferred that a civilian government should have 
to shoulder the opprobrium of accepting national defeat.”117 This myth played a fateful 
role with regard to Hitler’s gain of political power in 1933 and Germany’s collapse 
twelve years later. Moreover, “[i]t was fashionable in Weimar Germany to blame most of 
the country’s economic and financial problems on the Treaty of Versailles.”118 Both 
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trends became major burdens for the young democracy’s domestic politics and foreign 
affairs, but they were first and foremost a punchy argument for the republic’s enemies. 
2. Wilhelm Groener 
Wilhelm Groener was Schleicher’s mentor and a key figure in imperial Germany 
as well as in the Weimar Republic. According to Johannes Hürter, Groener demonstrated 
the “military expertise and political understanding … of a political soldier who expanded 
his functional mission and—at a time of political crisis—decisively influenced the 
[German] state’s internal affairs development.”119 Moreover, “Groener had a keener eye 
for political essentials and a broader view than Schleicher.”120 In October 1918, he 
replaced Ludendorff in the 3rd Army Supreme Command. In this function, Groener and 
Schleicher created “the strange alliance between the General Staff and the People’s 
Deputies which guarded the cradle of the German republic.”121 The Social Democrat 
Friedrich Ebert, Germany’s political leader after the emperor’s abdication in November 
1918, and Groener sought to thwart Bolshevism in Germany and, therefore, implemented 
the Ebert-Groener pact. 
The result was that Groener in his role as “the head of the First Quartermaster-
General’s department now gained a new importance as a sort of political Chief of 
Staff”122 in Germany. His goals were to prevent Germany’s fragmentation, to suppress 
domestic revolutionary developments, and to maintain the military’s political power.123 
Therefore, he “offered Ebert the support of the army in maintaining law and order and 
suppressing revolutionary uprisings; Ebert accepted.”124 At that time, “[i]t was Groener 
and Schleicher who … acted as the General Staff’s spokesmen, Groener acting in his 
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character of a friend of bourgeois democracy, while Schleicher was alert enough to see a 
chance for the Army’s survival in new clothing.”125 Ebert understood the pact as “a 
prospect of armed support should the Spartacists try to overthrow him. But Groener, a 
far-sighted man, was also thinking of the future: in this way he could preserve the 
Officers’ Corps and the General Staff, and save from the wreck of the imperial regime the 
most important element for Germany’s future.”126 
Eventually, the Ebert-Groener pact significantly contributed to the stab-in-the-
back myth, which, in its German variant after World War I, held that defeatist democratic 
politicians snatched defeat from the jaws of a victory that the German army was just 
about to deliver in the field. In December 1918, Ebert addressed in Berlin returning front 
soldiers as follows: “No enemy has overpowered you. Not until the superiority of men 
and material became overwhelming, we [the politicians] have given up the fight … With 
uplifted head you can return.”127 
As one of the key players during the period of repercussions after the Great War, 
Groener significantly paved the way for Germany’s later political developments and the 
tragic role of her soldiers in politics. In sum, “the political power that he maintained for 
the officers’ corps beyond the end of war and revolution held dangers and became a 
burden for the young republic.”128 
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With regard to foreign and domestic political affairs, Germany’s situation went 
from bad to worse and perhaps a little further within four years, when its isolation in the 
international system morphed into a worldwide enemy coalition that included the United 
States. Eventually, Germany lost territory, population, and economy, and the German 
military—the nation’s pride since the victory over France in 1871—found itself 
dramatically limited through the Treaty of Versailles—at least officially. During World 
War I, on the one hand, “the General Staff began to occupy in the national life as a 
whole, and the steady extension of its activities for the General Staff was already 
concerning itself with such matters as the press, films, general propaganda, armaments 
and food.”129 After 1918, on the other hand, Germany’s military elite, especially the 
members of the General Staff, faced a significantly different state and society than four 
years before.  
Within the same period, Schleicher’s world also had been turned upside down in 
the young Republic wracked by postwar chaos. Germany was neither an imperial 
monarchy nor independent with respect to its foreign affairs. He could barely recognize 
the society that struggled out of the privations and suffering. In November 1918, sailors 
of the German navy, the emperor’s pride, revolted during the Kiel mutiny, which event 
significantly contributed to the abdication of Wilhelm II. Democrats and socialists were 
struggling for political power and proclaimed two different German republics on 
9 November 1918 in Berlin. Moreover, Germany faced the loss of two million fallen 
soldiers as well as 2.7 million physically wounded or traumatized citizens.130 
Domestically, the old Wilhelmine order disappeared, and civil war swept the streets. The 
nation’s economic situation was disastrous, and, finally, Germany lost her overseas 
colonies. 
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In such circumstances, it is not surprising that Schleicher created his own political 
ambitions right after the war. In his perception, the nation faced a collapse of everything 
that he formerly understood as being essential for Germany’s power and future: strong 
autocratic (monarchic) leadership, economic power, military strength, influential elites 
(nobility), and significant military influence in governmental affairs. All this had—in 
Schleicher’s view—to be maintained, respectively, at least to be restored. 
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IV. POLITICS AFTER THE WAR AND THE BIRTH OF THE 
YOUNG DEMOCRACY—REICHSWEHR AND REPUBLIC 
On 18 January 1919, 48 years after the proclamation of the German Kaiserreich 
in the same place, 27 victorious states—led by the United States, Great Britain, France, 
and Italy—met in Versailles to conduct negotiations about the Great War’s consequences. 
Austria and Germany faced severe penalties, calculated both to punish the putative 
aggressors and to stymie future war production, broadly conceived. Germany lost 
13 percent of its territory, 15 percent of agricultural areas, 10 percent of its population, as 
well as significant mining and industrial capacities. Moreover, 90 percent of the German 
mercantile marine and 25 percent of the high-sea fleet sailed from now on under a foreign 
flag. The expropriation of Germany’s public and private foreign capital as well as the 
annulment of international patent law and copyright regimes for German companies 
spelled bitter disadvantages for international business activities. 
With regard to the military, Germany was allowed to maintain a professional 
army of 100,000 soldiers and a navy with a strength of 15,000. Battle tanks, submarines, 
and any semblance of an air force were prohibited. Furthermore, allied troops occupied 
Germany’s territory west of the Rhine, while on the eastern bank a demilitarized zone 
extended 50 kilometers. Germany remained notwithstanding significantly militarized. 
The official Reichswehr troops faced several activities to counterbalance its numeric 
disadvantage and retain a broad spectrum of military skills: “Thus, from September 
1921 onwards all members of transport units were unofficially trained as 
artillerymen.”131 
Based on a deal with the Army Supreme Command, armed Freikorps were 
established. Approximately 120 Freikorps with 400,000 members existed.132 These were 
“units of volunteers, organised [sic] by senior officers and n.c.o.s straight from the 
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front.”133 Many of them “had been brutalised [sic] by the war and new no other trade. 
Their politics … were crudely nationalist.”134 The Freikorps were one of several 
examples of Germany’s violation of the Treaty of Versailles and its tough conditions. 
Indeed, these paramilitary units “formed the basis of the Reichswehr, which thus from the 
beginning acquired an anti-republican spirit”135 
Other paramilitary units besides the Freikorps arose, as well. For example, 
“within the Berlin-Brandenburg Military District, [there arose] the 20,000-strong force of 
[blue-collar] Arbeits-Kommandos—later to become known as the ‘Black Reichswehr’—
in which future Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher had a hand.”136 Remarkably, “[t]hese 
units … were paid and supported partially from Reichswehr funds, and partly from 
donations by the industrial and agrarian organizations to which these battalions were 
assigned.”137 Thus, civilian elites like entrepreneurs and land holders—not necessarily 
Germany’s most democratic milieus—played a key role in Germany’s hidden military 
activities. 
The German government and the population perceived these conditions as unfair 
but, eventually, Berlin accepted the Treaty of Versailles, which became effective on 
10 January 1920. The Versailles Diktat, as the agreement came to be known in Germany 
in part because the terms were literally dictated to the German delegation at the end of the 
process, seemed like the least awful of several bad possibilities. Groener, for instance, 
assessed any military opposition as unwinnable. More broadly, a potential occupation of 
the whole nation was imminent.138 
These external circumstances only exacerbated the pressure on Germany’s 
democratic civilian leaders, who nonetheless sought stability and peace with key Western 
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players. However, nationalistic and conservative German circles, including Schleicher, 
successfully championed the understanding that it was not the defeat in World War I as 
such but the Treaty of Versailles that caused the bitter suffering of Germany’s 
population.139 
A. WEIMAR AND ITS (EARLY) DISCONTENTS 
The foundation of the democratic Weimar Republic140 as well as the Treaty of 
Versailles did not result in a stabilization of Germany’s domestic political situation at all. 
Until 1923, the existence of the young state was endangered through political rivalries as 
well as through severe economic and social problems. Furthermore, France maintained its 
pressure on the government in Berlin to fulfill or even increase the reparations for World 
War I.141 
Millions of families suffered with fallen or wounded fathers, brothers, and sons. 
During the war, women had to replace male workers who fought at the front. Gender 
roles had turned, and millions of returning soldiers—shouldering the horrible experiences 
of a total war and facing the disastrous repercussions of their formerly proud and great 
nation—had to be re-integrated into Germany’s society and economy, as damaged as 
both were. During and after the war, the overwhelming concern of millions of Germans 
was to satisfy their hunger and to survive. During hyperinflation in October 1923, 
malnutrition was a common phenomenon, and the city of Hamburg, for example, could 
only provide 50 percent of the weekly needed breadstuff for its population. Strikes, 
revolts, as well as plundering occurred. Large parts of the population saw no alternative 
to conducting criminal activities—for example smuggling or trading on the black 
market—to relieve the distress. Social conflict between interest groups occurred—rural 
populations versus city dwellers, white collar versus blue collar, consumers versus 
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producers. These tensions and the zero-sum mentality that went with them posed a grave 
and constant danger to the authority of the democratic state and its representatives.142 
1. Difficult Economic Conditions 
A disastrous inflation, a war-weakened economy—the German industrial 
production in 1919 had fallen back to the level of 1888143—as well as severe reparations 
were a challenging economic burden for the young republic. Germany faced a disastrous 
inflation, and millions of German people lost their savings. This development caused not 
just economic but also social repercussions: “Although the specific effects of inflation to 
particular social ranks have been by no means sufficiently examined, so far, there is no 
doubt that inflation made broad parts of the bourgeois middle class economically 
proletarian.”144 Millions of Germans embraced political radicalization or, at least, they 
became susceptible for extreme—notably anti-liberal respectively anti-democratic—
political positions. 
Because Germany had lost its mining capacities in the Ruhr, coal imports became 
necessary, financed by already extremely limited resources of foreign currencies. In 
1923, Germany’s earning covered only one seventh part of its spending, and the inflation 
developed rapidly: In December 1922, the exchange rate for one U.S. dollar was 
8,000 German marks; in April 1923, 20,000 marks; and in August 1923, as high as 
1 million marks.145 The government initiated a monetary reform, resulting in the 
implementation of the Rentenmark in November 1923. This step was essential for the 
nation’s economic recovery, which began 1924—more than five years after the armistice 
ended the war. 
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Of the German population’s daily life in the early 1920s, Mary Fulbrook 
describes: “Paper notes were simply stamped with a new increased value; people were 
paid their wages by the cartload; prices doubled and trebled several times a day, making 
shopping with money almost impossible; and the savings, hopes, plans, assumptions and 
aspirations of huge numbers of people were swept away in a chaotic whirlwind.”146 In 
parallel, there were significant numbers of Germans who truly benefitted from these 
economic circumstances. These inflation winners’ luxury lifestyle and their gormandizing 
were a severe provocation for the starving masses: “The unimaginably large contrast 
between undeserved prosperity and extreme material poverty had to result in social 
resentments and to pave a broad fundament for criticism on the capitalistic economic 
system.”147 This social turbulence had continuing consequences for Germany’s political 
development, and “[e]ven when the worst material impact was over [after 1924], the 
psychological shock of the experience was to have longer-lasting effects, confirming a 
deep-seated dislike of democracy”148 as well as skepticism toward capitalism. 
The reparations were bitter and painful, but they were not the main source for the 
difficult economic situation and the disastrous inflation. Some scholars emphasize that 
until 1922 the inflation even energized Germany’s economy and resulted in almost full 
employment—whereas England, for instance, faced an unemployment rate of 
approximately 20 percent in 1921.149 Inflation and reparations, however, offered an 
excellent fundament from which to shift the responsibility for Germany’s struggling from 
domestic political protagonists and decisions—for instance, the failure to initiate a 
negotiation peace in 1916/1917—to foreign powers like the allies or other assumedly 
influencing players like the Jews. German nationalistic circles developed the legend of an 
international finance-market Jewry (Internationales Finanzjudentum) that ruled the world 
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and that was accountable for the nation’s suffering.150 Large parts of the German elites, 
especially the military, believed and advanced this blaming of external powers, and, 
potentially without foresighted intention, “[t]hese were the people who later turned to 
Adolf Hitler as the messiah to lead them out of financial chaos.”151 
2. Domestic Political Rivalries 
From the very beginning, the young republic faced organizations and movements 
that aimed at eliminating the parliamentarian democracy. Weimar’s enemies contained of 
left- and right-wingers who fought a battle against the political system on the whole. 
Whereas the right-minded aimed at restoring the pre-democratic monarchy or a post-
democratic authoritarian Germany, left groups targeted on the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Right-wing circles used the stab-in-the-back myth to exonerate imperial 
Germany—and especially the leading figures—from the responsibility for the nation’s 
disaster. In the process, this myth—developed by Hindenburg and Ludendorff and 
broadly used by Germany’s military and conservative elites—became a dagger at the 
throat of the Weimar Republic.152 
During the first years following World War I, Germany did not enjoy peace at 
home but instead roiled with incidents of partisan violence tantamount to civil war. Riots 
and civil commotion as well as state of emergency were the rule in postwar Germany. 
Whereas the centrists in and around the young government sought to stabilize the 
fledgling democracy, extremists on the left and the right conducted armed revolts, 
murdered opponents, and implemented illegal governmental structures. The streets of the 
capital were particularly savage. For example, in 1920, socialist and communist 
protesters attempted to penetrate the legislative building in Berlin. Forty-two left-wingers 
were killed by the police. 
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A major incident initiated by the far right was the Kapp-Putsch. Supported by 
anti-republican Freikorps and Reichswehr forces, Wolfgang Kapp, a German civil 
servant and nationalist, initiated a rebellion against the democratic government in March 
1920. Due to the strength and equipment of these forces, the government tried to 
convince military leaders in Berlin to maintain or restore the republican order. The putsch 
lasted only four days after the legitimate government had left Berlin and Kapp’s 
supporters had declared his chancellorship. Eventually, the rebellion “was … brought 
down by a general strike,153 after the army had refused to fire on the putschist troops.”154  
Primarily responsible for the military’s scant support for the democratic 
government was Hans von “Seeckt, chief of the Truppenamt and, in effect, chief of staff 
of the army. Seeckt’s attitude was summed up in the words: “Troops do not fire on troops 
Do you perhaps intend … that a battle fought … between troops who have fought sight 
by side against the common enemy? … When Reichswehr fires on Reichswehr, then all 
comradeship within the officer corps has vanished.”155 It is, on the one hand, remarkable 
that “[t]he putsch was defeated by two principal forms of resistance: the general strike of 
the workers and the refusal of the higher civil servants to collaborate with their rebel 
masters.”156 The putsch posed a particular problem—and a particular solution—to the 
imperially minded Seeckt, and, with regard to the general’s desire to maintain the 
imperial army’s spirit, “the Truppenamt … was unofficially the carrier of the Great 
General Staff’s tradition, and it was in point of fact not long before it turned into much 
the same kind of school of uniform operational thought … .”157 
Seeckt’s behavior, on the other hand, “brutally exposed the helplessness of the 
nation’s government and president and had served to destroy the people’s faith in their 
Army.”158 He demonstrated several times his willingness to defeat leftists’ rebellion as 
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well as “his belief in the efficacy of ‘national thinking’, his antagonism to social 
democracy, [and] his antipathy to the constitution … .”159 When the Kapp-Putsch 
occurred, the legitimate president and chancellor were Social Democrats and, in Seeckt’s 
view, opponents, since he “was seriously considering the possibility of taking power into 
his own hands, either by way of military dictatorship or in the form of a Seeckt 
chancellorship.”160 The Reichswehr was indeed led by a potential rebel. 
Left-wing activists also sought to eliminate the parliamentarian democracy. 
Several strikes and armed rebellions shook the Weimar Republic from its left fringe, as 
well. Following the Kapp-Putsch, a force of up to 50,000 leftist combatants (“Rote 
Ruhrarmee”) fought against the nationalistic Freikorps, temporarily occupied large parts 
in western Germany (Ruhr), and implemented local workers’ councils as political 
institutions. It was a fight between nationalistic conservative and working class 
extremists, and the liberal democratic parties suffered from these dangerous 
repercussions. The government in Berlin fell back on the army as well as on Freikorps 
forces to establish law and order and to put down the revolt. Immediately after the 
military had denied defending the republic against right-wingers, the German army was 
indispensable to prevent socialist revolution. Eventually, the Kapp-Putsch resulted in a 
severe imbalance within Germany’s political structure and democratic procedures.161 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES 
In the event, the turmoil in Berlin drove the young German republic’s founding 
leaders to seek the relative quiet of Weimar, a resort town some distance south of the 
capital, to draft the constitution. The resulting document marked an ambitious 
proclamation of liberal ideals for a polity that had little real experience with democratic 
practice. Louis Leo Snyder understood the Weimar constitution as “a letter-perfect 
document embodying the best features of the British Bill of Rights, the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, and the first Ten Amendments of the 
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American constitution.”162 Nevertheless, a number of weaknesses in the Weimar 
constitution and the politics that ensued ultimately resulted in the destruction of 
Germany’s first democracy through right-wing nationalistic powers. 
It is, on the one hand, remarkable that, after the first years’ repercussions, the 
Weimar Republic faced a period of political stability, economic recovery, and—with 
regard to foreign affairs—Germany’s gradual reintegration in the international system. 
On the other hand, the constitution contained—besides domestic right- and left-wing anti-
democratic movements—dangerous vulnerabilities. In Hans Mommsen’s view, one of the 
key issues was the lack of a true unity between ruling and governing powers (Staat) and 
the society. He compares the constitution’s development progress with legislation 
processes in imperial Germany. This top-down approach—mainly executed by high-
ranking public servants—did not sufficiently involve political parties respectively the 
people’s will.163 Eventually, “[t]he Republic’s fatal lack of legitimacy caused people to 
look all too readily to other political solutions for Germany’s ills.”164 
For one thing, the new constitution did not specify a minimum threshold of votes 
for parties to become a member of the parliament.165 Because any party that could scrape 
together some support could—and did—enter parliament, the German legislature was 
fractured on even its best days. From 1919 until 1933, 11 parties gained governmental 
power, and from the first cabinet (13 February–20 June 1919) until Schleicher’s 
chancellorship (3 December 1932–28 January 1933) as many as 20 different cabinets 
existed.166 The republic was constantly suffering from these unsteady circumstances at 
the top of the governmental process. 
Another weakness of the Weimar constitution was the overwhelmingly powerful 
position of the president. Based on the goal to prevent disproportionate power by the 
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parliament and political parties, the president should serve as a counter-balancing 
element. In practice, however, his power led to an ill-functioning parliamentarianism, 
since political parties as well as members of parliament tented to excessively rely on the 
president’s solutions and actions in times of political crises.167 The president had the 
authority to dissolve the parliament and, moreover, a significant option for misusage was 
“Article 48 of the Weimar constitution … which gave the president the power to rule by 
decree in time of emergency … .”168 In the wrong hands, this article could result in 
cutting off all democratic institutions, and it had, indeed, “never been intended to be the 
basis for any more than purely interim measures; [however,] the Nazis made it into the 
basis for a permanent state of emergency that was more fictive than real and lasted in a 
technical sense all the way up to 1945.”169 
Furthermore, the Germans elected the president directly for a seven-year term. 
Candidates depended neither on a parliamentarian majority nor on a leading position as 
functionary in one of the major parties. From this office, powerful but unconnected to 
representative politics, Hindenburg returned to power, now as a civilian—and the thin 
edge of an anti-democratic wedge in Berlin. That is, despite the disastrous end of the war 
and its calamitous repercussions, “[t]he advent of an old-line militarist [Hindenburg in 
1925] to the presidency—an event of incalculable importance—was made possible by the 
least politically minded fringe of the German electorate. These people were not greatly 
concerned about constitutional or ideological questions; they were swayed, first and 
foremost, by their adoration of the man.”170 The 77-year-old general field marshal 
fulfilled the desires for leadership and strength that large numbers of Hindenburg’s 
supporters had in their hearts and minds when they recalled imperial Germany.  
With regard to these desires, it is not surprising that, when Hindenburg arrived in 
Berlin after his election, he “was received … with a tumultuous welcome. The flags 
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displayed were the black-white-red banners of the Empire,”171 but also the black-red-
golden ones of the republic.172 Eventually, “[t]he 1925 presidential elections 
demonstrated the discontent with the republic and were perceived as stabilizing reversion 
to the pre-revolutionary time.”173 Moreover, Hindenburg’s election opened a unique 
chance for Germany’s military elite in general and Kurt von Schleicher in particular: 
Suddenly, the restoration of their beloved autocratic order, including significant military 
influence in governmental affairs, seemed within reach. 
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V. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN WEIMAR AND 
SCHLEICHER’S INCREASING POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
The early years of the Weimar Republic’s civil-military relations were 
characterized by the process whereby the army had transferred itself into the new 
republic without either having engaged in the fundamental reforms needed to secure the 
place of the soldier in the constitution. That is, the civilian government and the 
Reichswehr operated in parallel existence. Most importantly, the General Staff retained 
its nationalistic, monarchic, as well as militaristic attitude; viewed the democratic 
republic with skepticism; and had defied efforts at democratic civilian control.  
Whereas diversified political parties and their protagonists sought genuine 
improvements to the nation’s difficult situation, the military focused solely on its own 
power, influence, and interests—which it perceived as coinciding with or leading the 
national interest as the state superior to mass politics. It acted disconnectedly from 
Germany’s governmental activities—in some connections, even illegally. The 
Reichswehr did not serve as a politically neutral supporter and protector of the 
constitution and its democratic elements but perpetually sought to steer, if not control, 
German domestic and international politics. This effort became closely associated with 
Kurt von Schleicher. 
Schleicher played a key role in this process during the Weimar Republic—and its 
demise. A remarkable post-World War I career allowed him to increase steadily his 
influence in German politics. Schleicher’s responsibilities and authorities constantly 
shifted from military affairs to political questions. Like Hindenburg, “[w]hat Schleicher 
wanted was power without responsibility,”174 but, eventually, he became a member of the 
German government. 
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A. THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL STAFF IN THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR 
AND VERSAILLES 1919–1933 
After the Kapp Putsch in 1920, the Reichswehr significantly strengthened its 
influence in governmental affairs. Moreover, the army’s self-perception as a decisive 
power in Germany as well as its anti-republican attitude put the civilian president in the 
role of a commander-in-chief who depended on the favor of his military elites. Led by 
Hans von Seeckt, the military’s goal was “the preservation of the Army’s integrity”175 as 
well as to establish a state within the state for a time once the republic had ended and a 
new state would form with the army in its old position of authority. Therefore, the army 
clearly demonstrated anti-democratic attitudes, and “[m]any leading officers claimed that 
while they supported the German nation, they could not support the democratic state: 
thus, in the early years, in different ways, Generals Groener, Seeckt and others co-
operated with right-wing groups and paramilitary organizations.”176 Furthermore, 
officers who had supported the putsch as well as soldiers who participated in that anti-
republican revolt remained in service.177 Especially Seeckt understood an apolitical 
Reichswehr in the way that active support of the republic had to be suppressed. As early 
as 1920, the German military had proved its failure with regard to the necessary ability 
and will to implement democratic attitudes. 
The army concealed both forces and equipment after the Treaty of Versailles 
became effective—specifically to flout the terms of the agreement, which German 
military leaders viewed as illegitimate and dangerous. According to the Treaty’s Article 
160, the Reichswehr was to be “devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within 
the territory and to the control of the frontiers.”178 This treaty’s article, “which lent the 
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Reich’s Army more the character of a police force, was never accepted in Germany,”179 
not least because it seemed to leave Germany helpless to counter any foreign aggression. 
These concerns existed with good cause, as Germany’s neighbors were restive. The 
hostile mood proved useful for Seeckt: “Taking advantage of the chauvinism displayed 
by the Poles in 1920 and 1921, he claimed that it was impossible to defend Germany’s 
eastern frontiers with the 100,000-man army … .”180 Thus, from the very beginning of its 
existence, the Reichswehr organized various covert and semi covert measures to have 
militarily trained people and operational weapons available outside of its official 
structures. 
In such circumstances, the secret military consolidation that the Reichswehr 
initiated is hardly surprising. It is striking, however, that several of these activities 
occurred without involving civilian governmental institutions—for example, “the hidden 
stocks of arms and equipment [Zeugmeistereien] in various parts of Germany, about 
which the civilian authorities, especially if they were known to be socialists or pacifists, 
were not informed.”181  
Seeckt’s secret program was of enormous scope and scale: disguised training for 
pilots; secret research and work on tanks as well as guns by German industry. Foreign 
firms, for example in Finland, Holland, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey, secretly produced 
and tested weapons for Germany.182 After the Treaty of Rapallo183 in 1922, Russia 
became Germany’s major partner for secret military activities. On the one hand, the 
Reichswehr conducted military exercises with tanks, air assets, and war gas—with regard 
to the Versailles Treaty illegal weapons. On the other hand, Soviet forces received 
German introductions in military training as well as in the functioning of the General 
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Staff.184 Tellingly, some of the bilateral “talks were held in the apartment of Major 
Schleicher, … whose taste for conspiracy became unbridled … .”185 
This—officially non-existent—General Staff was the decisive body to plan, 
execute, and coordinate all these activities. Hence, “there had been a successful attempt 
to bring over as many competent General Staff officers as possible from the old Imperial 
Army into the Reichswehr—a fact which helped to preserve that continuity which to 
Seeckt was a matter of such vital importance.”186 Continuity was a key issue for him, 
and, concerning the recruitment of promising officer candidates, his “personal preference 
was always for candidates who were of aristocratic birth and descended from the old 
military families … .”187 
1. Seeckt’s Leadership in State and Army 
Seeckt’s very “position of Chef der Heeresleitung … was contrary to the Treaty, 
for the provisions of Versailles not only forbade the Great General Staff, they forbade the 
existence of a generalissimo.”188 The victorious allies’ idea was a division of powers 
within the German military, and “[t]hey laid down that the command of the Reichswehr 
was to be in hands of a parliamentary War Minister who was to be civilian, and of two 
Group Commanders, each of whom was to have equal authority with the other.”189 
Seeckt successfully avoided this division of power. His position was uniquely powerful, 
and the strategy he developed rested on two major pillars: establishing and increasing his 
political influence and forming the “Reichswehr as the kernel of a future national 
Army.”190. 
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He and other members of the young democracy’s military elite successfully 
resisted any real or abiding change of attitude vis-à-vis Weimar: “[U]nder General von 
Seeckt, … from March 1920 to October 1926, most officers thought in terms of serving 
the state, not the republic … .”191 The general established unilateralist leanings and 
favored a decoupling of the German military from the legitimate government. Seeckt had, 
furthermore, direct access to the president and perceived himself—instead of the defense 
minister—as true spokesman for military affairs. After Hindenburg’s election to president 
in 1925, however, Seeckt’s position as the first soldier of the state diminished. This 
aspect caused, on the one hand, a rivalry with Seeckt who did not used to be awestruck 
when he met the matured World War I veteran. On the other hand, Hindenburg’s new 
presidential power clearly decreased Seeckt’s role and influence.192 
With regard to his political activities, Seeckt perpetually failed to comply with the 
letter or the spirit of the constitution, and “[t]he frequent result was enmity between 
Seeckt and the civilian ministers in the Wilhelmstrasse and at the Defense Ministry in the 
Bendlerstrasse.”193 Eschenburg concludes that “[i]n any event, Seeckt found democratic 
government and its potential control of the army inimical.”194 The result was that the 
responsible ministers grew more and more tired of Seeckt’s perception of the military’s 
superiority over civilian attitudes. Moreover, his highhandedness and the illegal activities 
of the Reichswehr endangered their politics.195 
Eventually, his conduct would cost him his job, once Hindenburg had become 
president of the republic. In 1926, Seeckt independently authorized the former crown 
prince’s son to participate in a Reichswehr manoeuver. His decision was broadly 
perceived as an affront to the republic: “This was more serious, especially since … the 
leftist and democratic press got wind of the matter and there was a storm of 
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indignation.”196 Furthermore, the French minister of foreign affairs embarrassed his 
German colleague by warning him about illegal rearmament efforts in Germany’s forces 
and expressed his skepticism “concerning the German government’s ability to keep the 
military under control.”197 Seeckt had significantly overstretched his authority with 
respect to domestic and foreign political affairs, and, eventually, “there was no alternative 
to demand for Seeckt’s resignation; and this was appreciated by all members of the 
government. … Seeckt’s fall was greeted with enthusiasm in republican circles.”198 
This victory for parliamentary control of the military, however, was somewhat 
illusory. The democrats could not implement significant changes in the armed forces, 
even with Seeckt gone. For instance, their efforts failed to end the military’s practice of 
hiring recruits and especially officers primarily from the conservative milieu.199 Seven 
years of Seeckt’s leadership had already paved the way for anti-republican attitudes 
within the Reichswehr and fatal later developments. After Seeckt had left office, the army 
abandoned its course of strict separation from the republican government, and the way 
was clear “for a new concept of national defence which implied stronger co-operation 
between the Reichswehr and the State executive … .”200 This development was not solely 
of voluntary character. Domestic and foreign political pressure forced the military to 
inform the government about its hidden activities in February 1927. 
2. Groener’s Vision 
Another significant aspect was the Reichswehr leaders’ growing understanding 
concerning the essential role of modern economics and technology to maintain and 
develop adequate German military forces. It was Wilhelm Groener—minister of defense 
since 1928—who identified that Seeckt’s policy was a dead-end street.201 He understood 
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that a holistic approach was indispensable, since “[a]n enforcement of … armament could 
hardly be executed offside as before, but required the support and integration of the 
government, the economy, and the people.”202 This new approach—shared by a 
reforming group of officers, either oriented to U.S. practice or that of the Soviet Union—
became feasible, because Germany’s economy had developed quite well and the military 
saw a perspective to participate and to benefit: From 1924 until 1929, Germany paid 10 
billion marks for reparations, but received loans of 25 billion marks from the United 
States. The nation’s merchandise export prospered as its industry modernized.203 
Germany’s re-armament program was Groener’s major focus, and his broad 
military and political experience—from June 1920 to August 1923 he had functioned as 
crossbench minister of transportation—enabled him to implement major changes with 
regard to the Weimar Republic’s civil-military relations. Groener built a bridge between 
the military technocrats and the republican government. Probably, he was one of the very 
few German General Staff officers who truly included long-term strategic impacts: “In 
Germany, much more than in the Anglo-Saxon countries for example, the scope of the 
discussion was reduced to a consideration of operational warfare [that is, the operational 
level of war versus the strategic level]. This discussion revealed that the phenomenon of 
war between industrialized countries had become so complex and the preconditions end 
effects of such a war so difficult to estimate, that intellectual appraisal was limited to 
isolated aspects only.”204 
On the one hand, Groener significantly contributed to the improvement of the 
Weimar Republic’s poor civil-military relations. He served the republic loyally; sincerely 
seeking to increase the nation’s military capabilities. He foresaw the requirements for 
comprehensive domestic as well as for politico-military approaches within Germany’s 
foreign affairs, in the epoch of Minister of Foreign Affairs Gustav Stresemann and the 
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stabilization after the mid-1920s. On the other hand, his ideal was an authoritarian and 
centralized state with democratic as well as social elements. Groener did not show 
revanchist attitudes, but his political goal to revitalize Germany’s great-power efforts 
demonstrates his revisionist character.205 Wilhelm Deist concludes, that he “was certainly 
no democrat, as many of his contemporaries took him to be. He was a republican by 
reason rather than conviction (Vernunftrepublikaner), but there were few enough even of 
these in the higher officer corps … .”206 
With regard to Schleicher’s political ambitions and activities, Groener’s mandate 
as minister of defense was a development with historic consequences. Now—henceforth 
in influential functions in Berlin—”Hindenburg, Groener, and … Schleicher, the decisive 
people in power of the Army Supreme Command in 1918/19, were unified again.”207 
B. SCHLEICHER’S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 
On 20 December 1918, Kurt von Schleicher—holding the rank of major—
explained his political ambitions to other General Staff officers. First, he sought to restore 
Germany’s governmental power and authority; in his view a strong Reichspräsident with 
a strong military. His second goal was the reconstruction of the economy. Finally he saw 
the need to reconstitute Germany’s military power as instrument for foreign affairs. 
These political goals were strongly connected to the main threats for Germany that 
Schleicher perceived: left- and right-wing extremists as well as foreign powers. 
Therefore, a powerful and centralized German state was indispensable. All his following 
military and political activities focused on these views and ambitions.208 
Hence, it is not surprising that Schleicher became more and more a soldier in 
politics, an effort made easier by the chaos of the post-war era. He was successful in 
perpetually increasing his influence in Germany’s governmental affairs. His later 
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chancellorship was not an accident but the result of a long-term process. In November 
1919, he—the desk-bound officer—started an assignment in Seeckt’s Truppenamt, and 
his fields of duty were domestic and politico-military affairs. It is remarkable that, as a 
consequence of the impact of total war on state and society, the German military thus 
implemented a department for domestic politics for the first time ever.209 
In the following years, Schleicher enjoyed several significant career advances and 
promotions amid the struggle of the young republic to find its footing. From April 1922, 
he led the Group T 1 III, an independent department within the ministry of defense and 
responsible for political affairs,210 and “[i]n 1923 he was promoted to the rank of 
lieutenant-colonel.”211 This position changed Schleicher’s daily activities dramatically 
and allowed him access to the Weimar Republic’s elite circles. Performing tasks for 
Seeckt or the minister of defense, he gained access to the chancellor and to political party 
leaders.212 
The result was a comprehensive picture and opinion concerning domestic political 
developments and the young democracy’s economic circumstances. With regard to the 
numerous revolts in post-war Germany, for instance, Schleicher wrote in an exposé of 
August 1924 that—in the republic’s first years—the military state of exception several 
times strengthened the authority of the Reich and, moreover, that it was an act of public 
welfare to support the general German weal.213 Furthermore, Schleicher used the new 
function as platform to expand his political network as well as to promote his favor for 
conspiracy: “The ensuing years found Schleicher making the most of his contacts and 
indulging freely his penchant for intrigue.”214 Both aspects played a key role during 
Schleicher’s ascent to chancellorship in the twilight of the republic. 
                                                 
209 Vogelsang, Kurt von Schleicher, 32–33. 
210 Strenge, Kurt von Schleicher, 22. 
211 Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, 409. 
212 Vogelsang, Kurt von Schleicher, 36. 
213 Strenge, Kurt von Schleicher, 26–27. 
214 Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, 409. 
  62
1. Schleicher Barges in Politics 
The election of Hindenburg as president in 1925 brought further major changes in 
Germany’s civil-military relations in general and in Schleicher’s opportunities in 
particular. It was clear that the new, militarily experienced, president (Feldmarschall-
Präsident) would pay more attention to military affairs than his predecessor Ebert who 
was a civilian politician. Hindenburg also changed the nature of constitutional and mass 
politics in Germany, lessening somewhat the sense of illegitimacy among those who 
scorned Weimar, which marred the first years of the new state. 
In line with the military’s change toward cooperation with the civilian 
government once Seeckt had vanished, Schleicher began immediately to barge into 
domestic political affairs. Therefore, the new course cannot be understood at all as a 
“change of the distinct anti-parliamentarian attitude of the armed forces. Schleicher’s 
already in 1926 submitted plans for an authoritarian constitutional reform allowed to 
realize that the time of [the military’s] abdication of direct interventions in domestic 
politics was going to end.”215 
After Seeckt left office, the military began broad activities in Germany’s domestic 
political affairs. Indeed, its desire for a monarchy still existed, but the republic was 
accepted as a necessary evil. Schleicher sought a special relationship between the 
president and the Reichswehr while, at the same time, he strove to weaken the parliament 
and the political parties. He admitted that a return to a German monarchy was not 
realistic and wanted the soldiers loyally to serve the republic. However, Schleicher early 
focused on the military’s role as the president’s essential power source to maintain law 
and order. In his view, the constitution’s Article 48 was an ideal instrument to counter all 
kinds of difficult political situations in Germany.216 Moreover, Schleicher was not 
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concerned with regard to the form of government as such. His focus was exclusively to 
find a proper arrangement for the military within the given circumstances and guarantee 
its most possible influence in governmental affairs. It is not surprising that Schleicher 
demonstrated a glaring lack of the political neutrality that is essential for an army of a 
democratic state. Instead, he sought actively to keep the Social Democrats out of the 
cabinet, while he also supported right-wing political parties, which he viewed as sharing 
the interests of the army.217 
2. Schleicher and Hindenburg 
In 1926, the German Minister of Defense Otto Gessler “established a new Armed 
Forces Section in the Defense Military, to assist him in liaison with the services, and to 
improve coordination between the Ministry and the Army and Navy Commands.”218 He 
named Schleicher to the position. Schleicher, holding the rank Colonel, thus became the 
informal head of Germany’s politico-military affairs in the ministry (such as it was),219 
and, in fact, the defense minister’s political advisor.220 This function as well as his 
excellent connections to the Hindenburg family enabled him to and steer German politics. 
Through the Reichspräsident’s son “Oskar, who … served as his father’s personal 
adjutant, Schleicher was able to gain admittance to the presidential palace at will.”221 
Schleicher made the most of his rising influence with Hindenburg, and in 1926/27 he 
suggested that the president should implement a nationalistically orientated government 
without involving the political parties. This advice was probably the first step for 
Hindenburg’s authoritarian presidential governance that he showed in the final years of 
the Weimar Republic.222 
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3. Schleicher and Groener 
The president developed the habit of appointing ministers himself.223 When, in 
January 1928, the position of the minister of defense was vacant, Hindenburg sought a 
candidate with excellent military as well as political background. Ideally, this candidate 
would be an officer whom the president knew and trusted from World War I and who had 
no fear or reservations about conflict with the parliament. The president chose an officer 
who had several times demonstrated his unconditional loyalty and who had contributed to 
preserve Hindenburg’s public reputation: Wilhelm Groener.224 
In his inaugural address, Groener made clear that his sole focus was to serve 
Hindenburg faithfully; he gave no consideration to the political parties’ concerns. 
Furthermore, he emphasized his unique function in the government that, in contrast to 
other cabinet posts, allowed him to work independently from party political or 
parliamentarian influence, itself reflective of the weaknesses of democratic civil-military 
relations in this phase of the Republic. 
Groener developed the attitude of a presidential minister of defense [präsidialer 
Reichswehrminister].225 Similar to Schleicher, his major focus was to increase the 
political and military power of the Reichswehr, and “he was in complete agreement with 
Hindenburg and all the other old-line militarists. Like them, he dreamed of restoring the 
army to its former place in Germany [sic] society.”226 Schleicher was one of Groener’s 
closest friends and “was, indeed, considered by the new Reichswehr Minister as his 
‘adopted son’.”227 In March 1928, Groener assigned to Schleicher “the newly created 
Ministeramt of the Reichswehr Ministry, a political liaison body between the armed 
services on the one side and the Reich ministries and the political parties on the other.”228 
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It is remarkable that the parliament aimed at manning the position with a civilian servant 
but Schleicher prevailed. Due to this new position, Major General Schleicher gained a 
status comparable to a Staatesekretär, (secretary of state), and, eventually he joined more 
meetings of the cabinet than the minister himself.229 From now on, Schleicher was 100-
percent a soldier in politics as the Republic was about to enter into a new period of 
turbulence. 
Meanwhile, the international and economic environment that had allowed the 
Weimar Republic to gain strength ended in crisis. The collapse of the New York stock 
market in October 1929 and the following global economic crisis brought again severe 
suffering for the German population. Foreign loans to Germany were drawn-off, and the 
number of unemployed people increased from 1.3 million to more than 6 million in 
January 1933. The nation’s industrial production faced a 40 percent reduction, and the 
German export shrank from 13.5 to 5.7 billion marks.230 A radicalization of the 
population was the consequence. Groener and Schleicher were in fear of left- and right-
wing political extremism and sought to increase the army’s strength to 300,000, including 
militia elements, to suppress potential domestic revolts.231 
In 1929/1930, the government broke apart, and Hindenburg declared the state of 
emergency referred to Article 48. From now on, the president began—amid significant 
influence by Schleicher232—to implement cabinets without accommodating the political 
parties’ will, an undertaking that was ever more difficult granted the posture of 
parliament.233 Eventually, in late March 1930, “the last cabinet of the Weimar Republic 
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to rely on parliamentary support was replaced by a presidential cabinet under Chancellor 
[Heinrich] Brüning, which, lacking majority support in parliament, was to rule by 
presidential decree.”234 Without understanding the comprehensive dimensions and 
potential later consequences of their politics, Hindenburg and Schleicher began to carry 
Weimar Republic’s democracy to its grave. 
C. THE RISE OF THE NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE DEUTSCHE 
ARBEITERPARTEI (NSDAP) 
A speech that Hitler gave in March 1929 in Munich forced Groener and 
Schleicher to consider seriously the NSDAP and its political activities, where before, they 
had little time for a rabble-rousing former enlisted man with his Jew-baiting and social-
leveling tendencies. In his speech, Hitler had criticized the Reichswehr as a protector of 
democratic-Marxist interests and its domestic role as potential police force in case of 
crisis. This role and responsibility of the military, however, was one of Schleicher’s core 
concerns, and he meant to keep Hitler’s supporters from infiltrating the army.235 Initially, 
Groener and Schleicher actively suppressed the NSDAP’s influence within the 
Reichswehr, for instance through suspension of all employees who were party members 
from the military’s plants in July 1929. The defense minister and his major advisor 
perceived the Nazis as illegal and revolutionary.236 
Hitler’s rising popularity—and volubility—demanded their attention. Both 
Groener and Schleicher were aware that Hitler’s demands to increase armament, to break 
free of the Treaty of Versailles’ chains, to politicize the military, as well as to keep left-
wingers out of the army, were goals that many soldiers shared. Groener and Schleicher 
understood that this expanding radical movement with its anti-republican, nationalistic, 
and military-friendly behavior resonated with many officers, who had resentments 
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against “the desk-bound generals in [the ministry of defense] in the Bendlerstraße and 
their spineless demeanor toward the republic… .”237  
In 1930/1931 though, Groener and Schleicher—quite impressed by the 
movement’s nationalistic and military orientation—changed their mind and initiated the 
army’s cooperation with the NSDAP and its paramilitary wing, the SA, with respect to 
homeland defense and border protection issues. It was especially Schleicher who sought 
to tame the radical movement through the integration of NSDAP and SA in responsible 
functions. Eventually, he did not see that the Nazis had not given up their subversive 
goals, at all, but Hitler and his entourage had drawn a curtain of legality over their illegal 
purposes.238 Schleicher’s strategy of taming and coopting the NSDAP and SA was based 
on a fatal misjudgment: “What men like Hindenburg … and Schleicher failed to grasp 
was that there would be no place for themselves (except as tolerated hangers-on) in 
Hitler’s totalitarian Reich, that he was not a man with whom genuine co-operation was 
possible.”239 
Groener, however—from October 1931 also in the function of provisional 
minister of the interior240—saw the rising threat that Hitler’s party posed to Germany’s 
constitutional order. Indeed, his double role complicated Groener’s activities 
significantly. For example, in January 1932— in the function as defense minister—he 
allowed the Reichswehr to hire NSDAP members and received—in his role as interior 
minister—severe critique by republican parliamentarians and representatives of several 
German states. These democrats complained that he did not put enough effort in 
antagonizing the Nazis. In contrast to Schleicher’s team, Groener’s more democratic 
advisors in the ministry of the interior convinced about the risk that the SA241 and the SS 
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(Schutzstaffel) posed to Germany’s order in general as well as to the army’s status as 
primary executive instrument in particular. 
In the first instance, Schleicher agreed with Groener’s decision to prohibit the SA, 
but shortly after—expecting potential negative consequences for the taming strategy—he 
changed his opinion. The minister, however, was strong-willed, and the prohibition 
became effective in April 1932. A wave of outrage roiled among right-wing and 
nationalistic groups as the SA paraded without its brown shirts, and Hindenburg—who 
never really took a position on the SA ban—held Groener responsible for these domestic 
political repercussions.  
Schleicher was shocked that his mentor had not followed his advice, flirted with a 
mental breakdown, and, eventually, initiated a campaign against the minister. The result 
was that the three generals’ ties of friendship were destroyed abruptly. Hindenburg and 
Schleicher were openly opposed to Groener and, on 11 May 1932, Schleicher declared 
the general officers’ threat of resignation in case the minister remained in office.242 
Ultimately—in an event fateful for the history of Germany and its weak democracy—
Groener resigned and, on 1 June 1932, and Schleicher became minister of defense. 
D. CONCLUSION 
On the occasion of a cabinet session on 9 September 1932, the defense minister 
frankly stated that it was he who was effectively in power in Germany.243 Such hubris 
was an augur of catastrophe for his country and, in view of 30 June 1934, for Schleicher 
himself. 
The general’s ascent in the Weimar Republic’s military as well as in its political 
affairs symbolizes a remarkable biography of disaster for an officer in politics as well as 
for the efficacy of an army in a democracy. From the vantage of the present, with the 
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knowledge of the tragedy this course of events wrought, his anti-democratic and anti-
republican attitudes should have hampered him from gaining a major role within 
Germany’s attempt to modernize the nation’s politics In the shaky democracies of 
interwar Central Europe in crisis, however, the strong man with militaristic inclinations 
appeared with unfortunate frequency on the political stage. It was Schleicher’s fortune 
that he was the protégé of powerful old-school key players who could revive the 
influence that they used to have in imperial Germany to the new political circumstances. 
Schleicher’s desires for the military’s significant influence in political affairs as well as 
for authoritarian governance perfectly suited in these key players’ perceptions. 
Whereas, Hindenburg, Groener, and Seeckt just temporarily functioned in 
responsible positions of Weimar Germany, Schleicher was perpetually in charge. In the 
beginning, he acted as a background soldier in politics. Now, from June 1932 on, he was 
an official and legitimate member of the German government. His significant influence 
on the venerable president allowed him to manage the implementation of new minsters as 
well as of governments on the whole. He was driven by a huge hunger for power 
regardless of long-term ties of friendship. In doing so, Hindenburg and Schleicher were 
exclusively focused on potential conservative political constellations and candidates. 
Their heritage, education, and attitudes made them doubtless convinced that their 
political beliefs implied the best and promising for Germany’s future. These soldiers in 
politics wanted a strong and powerful Germany so badly that, eventually, both became 
blind in their right eyes, maneuvered mistakenly, and Schleicher was the steersman. 
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VI. SCHLEICHER’S CHANCELLORSHIP PAVES THE WAY  
FOR HITLER 
In June 1932, Hindenburg implemented a new government of men drawn from 
the right and made a seven-league step toward the junking of democracy. Its members 
were mainly conservative noblemen without political mandate.244 A man of Schleicher’s 
choice, “the Catholic Franz von Papen[,] became Chancellor—losing the support of his 
own Centre Party in the process,”245 because Papen succeeded Brüning, a colleague and 
member of the same political party.246 This hollowing out of the political center proved 
fateful. 
Schleicher supported Papen for four major reasons: First, he mistakenly thought 
that Papen could be easily influenced and steered. Second, Papen was a friend of 
Hindenburg and the latter’s son and would properly suit Schleicher’s political network. 
Third, Papen could not count on a parliamentary majority and was an ideal candidate for 
governance according to Article 48, based on the powerful role of the president. Fourth, 
Papen’s good connections with France offered the opportunity to improve the German-
French relations and potentially enable a peaceful neighborhood.247 
In the beginning of his chancellorship, Papen met Schleicher’s expectations: “On 
4 June the Reichstag was dissolved and new collections called for 31 July. The ban on the 
SA … was lifted on 18 June, and despite the fact that the paramilitary organizations of 
the [communist] KPD were still outlawed, there was near civil war on the streets as Nazis 
and Communists engaged in violent battles.”248 Moreover, “[t]he alleged failure of the 
Prussian state police to control political violence—which had in effect been legalised 
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[sic] by the Reich government, with its unleashing of the SA—provided the justification 
for a coup against the Prussian state government.”249 With regard to Prussia—Germany’s 
largest state, led by the Social Democrats—conservative circles aimed at destroying the 
Prussian “republican fortress”250 to eliminate potential resistance against the federal 
government’s monarchic-authoritarian restoration politics.251 This so-called 
Preußenschlag “was applauded by [right-wing Foreign Minister Konstantin von] Neurath 
and Schleicher, the officer corps, and the bureaucracy.”252 
Schleicher saw Papen as a useful tool to realize his political goals, but the 
minister of defense completely underestimated the chancellor’s skills. Papen used to be 
well involved and connected in Berlin’s elite circles. He had access to a group “that 
included Kurt von Schleicher. … Within that group Papen was frequently addressed as 
“Fränzchen,” a playfully condescending diminutive.”253 Papen, however, developed his 
own style and agenda: “The assertiveness that Papen began to display once he was in 
office therefore surprised and annoyed Schleicher. On one occasion, after talking with 
Chancellor von Papen on the telephone in his capacity as defense minister, the general 
turned to his aides and quipped ruefully: “What do you say about that, Fränzchen has 
discovered himself.”“254 In Schleicher’s view, it had been a major mistake to 
underestimate Papen. Therefore, it is not surprising that he resolved that Papen had to be 
replaced. At this moment, the general “had decided to move from behind the scenes to 
center stage.”255 
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A. SCHLEICHER’S COOPERATION WITH HITLER 
Another man whose skills and goals Schleicher would severely underestimate and 
misunderstand was the leader of the NSDAP, Adolf Hitler. From spring 1932 on, several 
secret meetings between Schleicher and Hitler occurred, because the NSDAP and its 
paramilitary forces had become ever more prominent in Germany’s politics—though they 
also posed a commensurate threat to the domestic order. Schleicher was convinced that 
he could weaken the Nazi movement and exploit it for his political goals. 
Several of Schleicher’s and Hitler’s interests were similar, at least at first blush. 
They both agreed on the efficacy of dismissing Defense Minister Groener and Chancellor 
Brüning; emplacing Papen as chancellor; annulling the prohibition of the SA; dissolving 
the parliament as well as the scheduling of new Reichstag elections; and disempowering 
Prussia’s government. They were anti-democratic as well as anti-republican, and they 
aspired to an authoritarian order. Concerning Papen’s chancellorship, however, their 
differences were striking: Schleicher, on the one hand, wanted to use the marionette 
Papen to achieve his own political goals. Hitler, on the other hand, saw in Papen a weak 
intermediate chancellor whom he intended to replace soon.256 
Schleicher’s military technocratic mind did not anticipate Hitler’s intentions and 
the fatal consequences of his own politics. He mistakenly believed that he was in control 
of the nation’s future destiny and did not understand the terrific intentions behind the 
Nazis’ façade: “[A]lthough Schleicher had talked with Hitler at length on several 
occasions, he had failed to notice that the Nazi leader was not an ordinary politician. It 
had escaped him that Hitler firmly believed not only that he alone possessed the correct 
formula for Germany’s future but also that he could not fail because destiny was on his 
side.”257 Unintentionally, Schleicher’s politics helped realize Hitler’s vision of a unified 
Volksgemeinschaft—led by a totalitarian leader, the Führer, who would implement the 
nation’s will despite social, confessional, and regional differences.258 
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B. TAKING OFFICE FROM FRANZ VON PAPEN 
The Reichstag election on 31 July 1932 brought a major success for the NSADP 
but no absolute majority. Hitler immediately informed Schleicher that he was not willing 
anymore to tolerate Papen’s chancellorship and demanded to build a new government 
under his leadership. Schleicher was willing to accept Hitler’s chancellorship in early 
August 1932, but Hindenburg was reluctant. The president, on the one hand, appreciated 
the Nazi movement’s potential contribution to fulfill one of his core wishes, a national 
restoration and the German people’s unity in the Volksgemeinschaft. On the other hand, 
Hindenburg was concerned that Hitler—backed by a strong party movement—could 
decrease or even eliminate the president’s power. At least in summer 1932, Hindenburg 
saw Hitler as inexperienced in governmental and administrative issues and, worse, as 
Austrian corporal who was not qualified to lead Germany’s government.259 As such, 
Hindenburg rejected Hitler’s plan, and, from August 1932, the NSDAP embarked on a 
course of confrontation with Papen’s cabinet.260 
Papen could not implement a stable government, but he still had Hindenburg’s 
backing. After a parliamentarian no-confidence vote in September 1932 that Papen lost 
by 42 to 513 votes, Hitler’s party fellow Hermann Göring, who functioned as 
Reichstagspräsident from 30 August 1932 on, undertook to manage the parliament’s 
activities in favor of the NSDAP. Eventually, Papen’s resounding defeat—unique in 
Germany’s parliamentary history—sorely damaged his cabinet’s prestige.261 Therefore, 
Hindenburg and Papen had little choice other than to schedule new elections. 
 On 6 November 1932, the next Reichstag election followed to no particular 
effect. Although the NSADP faced significant losses, the Nazi party was by far the 
largest faction in parliament. The formation of a new government remained out of reach. 
Hindenburg and Papen favored the declaration of a state of emergency, including, if 
necessary, the forcible suppression of the political parties as well as political 
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organizations. Minister of Defense Schleicher, however, declared that the Reichswehr 
was not able to counter domestic civil-war incidents—which were likely after the 
declaration of the state of emergency, especially by Nazi units—as well as potential 
foreign threats at Germany’s eastern border. 262 A confidant supported Schleicher’s view: 
Lt. Colonel Eugen Ott, a General Staff officer who served in the ministry of defense, 
presented to the cabinet an unrealistic, but appealing worst case scenario (Planspiel Ott) 
that showed the Reichswehr’s inability to counter a simultaneously occurrence of a SA 
revolt, a general strike, and a Polish attack.263 Eventually, Papen—feeling betrayed by 
Schleicher’s denial to support the state of emergency—abdicated on 17 November 1932, 
and, on 3 December 1932, Schleicher took office as German chancellor. 
C. CORNERSTONES OF SCHLEICHER’S GOVERNMENT 
When Schleicher became chancellor, Germany’s situation was turbulent and 
chaotic. Although some indications existed of a glimmer of economic improvement, 
millions of Germans were still unemployed. Political parties used this dire situation for 
actions that were often violent, especially when the NSDAP was involved. Schleicher 
understood that a stable and functioning government was essential to end this crisis. His 
plan was to form an alliance among the Reichswehr, labor unions, and youth fraternities, 
which would serve as well as to divide the Nazis. Moreover, Schleicher sought to 
integrate Georg Strasser, a top-level Nazi functionary with a Freikorps background, into 
his cabinet and to implement a sort of German fascism to weaken Hitler’s movement.264 
1. Schleicher’s Official and Secret Goals 
Schleicher, like large parts of Germany’s bourgeois circles, preferred to exclude 
the raucous political parties from government and legislative power. At this juncture, the 
presidential cabinets provided a helpful platform to diminish the parties’ influence and 
their perception within the German public. It was Schleicher’s misinterpretation and 
                                                 
262 Kolb, Die Weimarer Republik, 146. 
263 Büttner, Weimar—Die überforderte Republik, 485. 
264 Haffner, Von Bismarck zu Hitler, 226–227. 
  76
failure that the major pillar of his political power, the Reichswehr, was too poor to 
formulate and to enforce national politics.265 
In a broadcast address that he used as a sort of government declaration on 15 
December 1932, Schleicher appeared conciliatory and even charming. It is noteworthy 
that he began his speech by shielding Hindenburg from criticism from the parliament’s 
most senior member. Additionally, Schleicher closed with quote by Moltke, as typical of 
the era. In his address, the chancellor emphasized the military’s essential role as the 
nation’s primary school for growing a disciplined, sober, and comradely German youth. 
The Treaty of Versailles, however, prohibited conscription, and Schleicher underlined the 
significant contribution of the youth fraternities to soldierly virtue of Germany’s young 
male population. Furthermore, he stated that the treaty violated the nation’s right to gain 
equality to other major powers with regard to its military capabilities. 
Despite these clear military references, the chancellor highlighted that his goal 
was not a military dictatorship; rather he aimed to gain broad support from the German 
population. The chancellor lavished most attention in his speech to his government’s 
efforts to mitigate the suffering of the people, particularly his job-creation program.266 
Chancellor Schleicher understood socialism and capitalism as dogmatic 
ideologies and claimed, instead, to represent a politics of pragmatism. This view, his 
employment program, as well as his goal of harmonization with labor unions caused 
skepticism among influential circles on the right. German industrialists and great land 
owners were concerned that a uniform-wearing socialist had gained power. Right-
wingers accused Schleicher of endangering Germany’s restoration that, heretofore, had 
been possible only through the strengthened nationalistic movement. These economic and  
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political interest groups more and more saw Hitler and his NSDAP instead of Schleicher 
and the Reichswehr as the essential plebiscite for an anti-Marxian and anti-democratic 
Germany.267 
Behind the scenes, Schleicher intensively prepared to save the system of 
presidential cabinets and, first and foremost, to prepare to implement the state of 
emergency according to Article 48. To do so, the chancellor needed to buy some time, 
because the required measures—for example military contingency plans to counter 
militant movements and governmental regulations to suppress the labor unions’ influence 
to strikers—could not be finished until January 1933. All these preparations were 
executed in the utmost secrecy.268 
2. The Failure of Georg Strasser and Schleicher’s Querfront (Divide and 
Conquer) Strategy 
Schleicher wanted to weaken the NSDAP by dividing it into two parts, with the 
center of gravity on the socialist part. Therefore, he sought cooperation with Gregor 
Strasser, a rival of Hitler whose focus was an anti-capitalist, national-Bolshevik platform 
within the constellation of party interests. At a cabinet meeting on 7 December 1932, 
Schleicher emphasized his wrong conviction that the NSDAP would tolerate his 
government.269 Four days earlier, Schleicher had invited Strasser to become vice-
chancellor as well as Prussia’s prime minister.270 
In contrast to Hitler, who aimed at replacing Schleicher and leading a potential 
government, the pragmatic Strasser favored the NSDAP’s governmental participation 
without the unrealistic claim to Nazi leadership. Strasser understood that the growing 
indications for a recovery of Germany’s economy could weaken the radicalization of  
the nation’s politics. Heavy NSDAP losses in municipal elections in Thuringia on 
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4 December 1932 were a warning signal. In the wake of this seeming setback, Strasser 
unsuccessfully attempted to convince Hitler to end the party’s all-or-nothing strategy and 
to join Schleicher’s government. The NSDAP faced another of its severe internal crises. 
As usual, Hitler came out on top, and Strasser relinquished his party functions on 
8 December 1932.271 Strasser’s failure spelled the end of Schleicher’s Querfront strategy. 
3. The Onslaught of the Interest Groups 
Germany’s cabinet records show that several interest groups significantly tried to 
influence Schleicher’s politics in his eight weeks of chancellorship. Whether or not these 
interests coincided with Schleicher’s political plans, the chancellor had to address them. 
Schleicher undertook to appease, assuage, or coopt many of them in an effort, ultimately 
futile, to win more support for his program. 
Governmental documents show also intense claims for support by farmers, 
industrialists, merchants, labor unions, and so forth. Many German peasants were in 
difficult economic situations, and Schleicher promised to protect them from foreign 
(price) competition.272 Hence, sufficient agrarian production for the German population 
and the farmers’ interests were a major topic as well as international trade treaties; 
customs procedures; and such multiple concerns of industrialists as labor time and wages. 
Agrarian lobbyists blackmailed the government and, furthermore, could count on 
Hindenburg’s sympathy. The NSDAP had significant support among the peasant 
population and publicly criticized Schleicher’s economic policy. Industrialists blamed the 
chancellor in his too intensive focus on agriculture. Within weeks Schleicher lost the 
support of the powerful agrarian lobby, on the one hand, as well as of Germany’s 
industrial head organizations, on the other hand.273 Furthermore, the German artisans 
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complained that the chancellor did not spend sufficient attention to their business and that 
the master manufacturers—traditionally bourgeois middle class people—might be 
politically radicalized.274 
Schleicher faced an aggressive and harsh domestic political atmosphere. For 
instance, Walther R. Darré—head of the NSDAP agency for agrarian policy and leading 
member of the still small SS—criticized Schleicher with scorn in a letter dated 
13 January 1933 as being hostile to Germany’s farmers and not willing to open 
Hindenburg’s eyes for 20th century requirements. Darré frankly blamed Schleicher as 
completely incapable.275 Eventually, the German chancellor faced a broad lack of support 
and saw only one solution to ensure stable governance as well as law and order: the state 
of emergency. 
D. THE CHANCELLOR’S MAJOR GOAL: STATE OF EMERGENCY 
From the very beginning of his chancellorship, Schleicher saw “in the 
proclamation of [a] state of emergency the sole remaining way to save the presidential 
regime.”276 This tactic would, among other things, postpone the new parliamentary 
elections, giving Schleicher a chance to stabilize his authoritarian government as well as 
the presidential cabinet system. At a meeting with his minister of justice and Bavaria’s 
prime minister on 10 December 1932, Schleicher did not rule out a state of emergency 
and even mentioned the idea that the German military might use heavy weapons to 
suppress potential revolts.277 A state of emergency might have offered the unique chance 
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to overcome the severe political crisis, prevent Hitler, and later restore Weimar’s 
republican democracy.278 Schleicher, however, focused on maintaining the president’s 
authoritarian power and illegal delay in scheduling new Reichstag elections instead of 
saving parliamentarianism.279 
As a matter of law as well as of personal preference, Schleicher would not 
proclaim a state of emergency on his own authority. He needed political advocates and, 
especially, the president’s approval. For his part, Hindenburg was more concerned about 
being impeached for breaching the constitution, so the president stalled. Politicians of 
SPD, Center Party, NSDAP, as well as the majority of labor unions and the press saw no 
cause for state of emergency in January 1933.280 The head of the Center Party, Ludwig 
Kaas, wrote Schleicher that any further delay in calling the new elections would be 
unconstitutional and have political as well as judicial consequences.281 
Then in January 1933,—for unknown reasons—Schleicher’s relationship with 
Hindenburg’s son Oskar dramatically degraded.282 All of a sudden, Schleicher faced the 
withdrawal of the president’s backing. Moreover, Hindenburg viewed Schleicher’s 
machinations in getting Papen removed as an infringement on presidential authorities. 
Hindenburg sought an arrangement between the government and the parliament, 
including the acceptance of a cabinet by the NSDAP. Because Schleicher had failed to 
tame or to integrate the Nazi party, his fate was foreseeable. At the next session of the 
parliament—scheduled on 31 January 1933—his government would face the same 
rejection and most likely a no-confidence vote—as Papen and his ministers some weeks 
before. 
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On 23 January 1933, the decisive meeting between Hindenburg and Schleicher 
took place. On the one hand, the president announced his will to consider dissolving the 
Reichstag. On the other hand, he declared that he could not take the responsibility to 
delay the new elections and that—with regard to the state of emergency—the political 
parties’ leaders should agree.283 It was obvious that Schleicher’s strategy had failed, and 
the two officers settled an emotional dispute. Notably, the intriguer Schleicher blamed 
Hindenburg for being conniving with respect to potential candidates who could replace 
the fortuneless chancellor.284 Indeed, powerful circles had started activities that 
endangered Schleicher’s political power, and the chancellor was aware of these 
developments. 
E. PAPEN AND HITLER DEFEAT SCHLEICHER 
Following its electoral setbacks in November 1932, the NSDAP staked its 
political “comeback” on the election in the German state of Lippe on 15 January 1933. 
“[S]ince it was one of the seventeen federal states, success there would not go 
unnoticed.”285 At the same time, the party was running short on money, so it needed bang 
for its Mark in this election. Lippe was a minor state with a 95-percent Protestant 
population that lived mainly in rural areas. These preconditions were ideal for the Nazis. 
The NSDAP mounted an enormous propaganda campaign. The republican press 
published dismissive comments, but in the end, the Nazis garnered 39.6 percent of all 
votes in Lippe. In Hitler’s view, the election marked an outstanding achievement. He 
continued to tell the story of the party’s glorious triumph and renewed his claim for 
chancellorship. 
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Hitler also took further steps to diminish Strasser’s role within the Nazi 
movement.286 One day after the Lippe election, Hitler arranged a closed-door meeting of 
NSDAP regional leaders (Gauleiter). It was, characteristically, a three-hour tirade—
discussion or voting were uncommon at these sessions. The main object of Hitler’s vitriol 
was Strasser: “Now, unleashing the full fury of his anger against Strasser, he reviled the 
renegade as a traitor and accused him of numerous offenses going back many years.”287 
Strasser, Schleicher’s great and perhaps last hope, was washed up. 
Meanwhile, Scheicher’s most recent political victim, Franz von Papen—aiming to 
settle the score of Schleicher’s intrigue against him—contributed directly and decisively 
to Hitler’s ascent. Papen arranged a meeting with Hitler at the Cologne residence of the 
influential financier Kurt Freiherr von Schröder by which the Nazi party’s leader could 
significantly increase his prestige.288 Indeed, “[t]he Hitler-Papen meeting … had 
momentous consequences, for it ended Hitler’s political isolation.”289 Hitler and his party 
now were seen to be political players with staying power and sufficient social chops to 
represent a broader range of conservative and nationalist voters—formerly Schleicher’s 
main supporters. Papen initiated various negotiations to integrate the NSDAP into the 
German government, and “[t]hese negotiations were initiated … with support of heavy 
industry; later they received the support of … Oskar von Hindenburg … .”290 
Hitler was aware of Papen’s excellent connections to Hindenburg, and “[h]e now 
had an offer of alliance from a former chancellor whose politics in office had won him 
the admiration of influential conservative circles and the affection of the head of the 
state.”291 Tellingly, a “photographer had been sent to Cologne by a politically well-
connected Berlin dentist whose practice included such diverse patients as former 
chancellor Heinrich Brüning, Gregor Strasser, and Schleicher. … Upon receiving 
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confirmation that the former chancellor [Papen] had met with Hitler, the dentist at once 
relayed the news to the Tägliche Rundschau, a Berlin newspaper sympathetic to 
Schleicher. He also sent a copy of the photograph of Papen to the chancellor.”292 
To gain power as German chancellor, it was essential for any potential candidate 
to become Hindenburg’s favorite. Mainly managed by Papen, “intrigues and 
machinations in highs places set in motion a campaign to convince the ageing president 
to appoint Hitler as Chancellor.”293 Hindenburg had unofficially authorized steps and 
negotiations to replace Schleicher. The president sought to effect the political 
constellation that he favored: a strong government of national convergence. Papen 
successfully smoothed out the differences between the key players and could suggest a 
new government on 29 January 1933.294 
It was Papen who believed “that, in order to include the Nazis, it would be 
necessary to offer Hitler the chancellorship.”295 The president was reluctant to embrace a 
Chancellor Hitler, but “[t]hose pressurizing Hindenburg to take this move were of the 
view that, if Hitler and one or two other Nazis were included in a mixed cabinet, they 
would be effectively hemmed in and could be ‘tamed’ and manipulated.”296 Moreover, 
his advisors convinced Hindenburg that Hitler, as a new chancellor, would have less 
power than his predecessor Schleicher—which meant a comparatively weaker chancellor 
and a comparatively stronger president.297 
The point merits repetition here: None of these political efforts by and among the 
conservative leaders, which made Hitler’s rise to power possible, were meant to bolster 
the Weimar Republic’s democracy or even to take the population’s will into 
consideration. Their “idea was that the army, industrial and agrarian elites would be able 
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to benefit from and subvert Hitler’s demagogic powers and mass support.”298 The plan, 
then—to the extent that there was one—was to preserve the basic aims of the 
conservative agenda while harnessing the electoral power of the National Socialists. 
On 28 January 1933, Hindenburg received Schleicher, and the chancellor 
emphasized that only the dissolution of the Reichstag could prevent Hitler’s 
chancellorship. Therefore, he said, a perpetuation of the presidential government was 
required. Hindenburg denied this request, and Schleicher and his cabinet stepped 
down.299 
In the cabinet’s session immediately before the chancellor met the president, 
Schleicher had expressed his belief that Hindenburg was still not willing to make Hitler 
chancellor.300 He was thoroughly mistaken, and, “[o]n 30 January 1933, Adolf Hitler 
was, by fully constitutional means, offered the chancellorship of Germany … .”301 In the 
end, it was Hindenburg’s decision that put the final nail in the coffin of Schleicher’s 
political career—and with it the fate of the first German Republic and peace in Europe. 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND WARNINGS FOR THE  
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Kurt von Schleicher’s story operates on several levels as concern civil-military 
relations and military professionalism in its encounter with mass politics. Chief among 
them is the epoch of total war and its impact on German soldiers and politics, whereby 
Schleicher is an extraordinary example of a politicized soldier with an authoritarian 
professional ethos who overestimated his capacity to make policy in the political world—
for which, as history judges, he was totally ill equipped. The first German Republic failed 
to integrate soldiers into its constitutional ethos, while soldiers did their best to damage 
and finally to destroy this republic according to their twisted idea of professionalism and 
a perverted conception of pluralism with its legacy of the 19th century and Germany’s 
defeat in 1918. 
Without doubt, Schleicher acted in what he deemed to be the nation’s best 
interest, and he tragically believed that the army—especially he himself and other 
General Staff officers in politics—knew the right solutions for Germany’s challenges in 
times of crisis. Such behavior betrayed his own myopia vis-à-vis mass politics and 
soldierly virtue, a misimpression with the most tragic consequences. 
A. SCHLEICHER’S RESPONSIBILITY 
Militarily socialized according to Moltke’s ideal of the role and the superiority of 
the German General Staff, Schleicher was also significantly influenced by such 
developments as the industrialization that dramatically changed Germany’s political, 
economic, and social circumstances. As a member of the middle class as well as of the 
military elite, Major Schleicher must have been shocked by the repercussions that 
occurred in Germany during and after World War I.  
In the last months of 1932, before Hitler gained power in Berlin, Schleicher’s 
political activities forced him to give up his behind-the-scenes role as a “grey eminence” 
political officer. In the final instance, Schleicher “owed his success to two things: an 
unusual talent for organization and intrigue; and the unfailing good-will of highly-placed 
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patrons.”302 His lack of comprehensive political understanding of democracy and the 
threat posed by its enemies to the state as well as his blind belief in the need of 
authoritarian political power—specifically in the hands of the nation’s war hero 
Hindenburg—became instrumental in Germany’s 20th-century tragedy. 
Schleicher’s personal tragedy was his complete isolation that he faced in his brief 
chancellorship. Without doubt, the political and economic challenges he had to tackle 
were enormous. Hindenburg, political parties, labor unions, powerful interest groups, his 
rival Papen, as well as the Nazi movement including its paramilitary units put incredible 
pressure on Schleicher’s politics. With respect to these circumstances, his failure is not 
surprising. Indeed, Schleicher was not a politician with a comprehensive understanding 
of the diversified political stage. He was a military technocrat, and the chancellor’s 
inability to balance the interests of all involved actors led within weeks to his political 
isolation. 
Schleicher’s further shortcomings, however, were his affinity for intrigues; his 
dramatic misjudgment of Hitler and Papen; and his disloyalty toward mentors and 
confidants like Groener. The general misused his excellent connections—notably to the 
Hindenburg family—for his own and the Reichswehr’s interests. He could not accept the 
rules of democracy, plurality, and established political procedures. Schleicher might have 
been brilliant within politico-tactical manoeuvers, but his missing strategic understanding 
let him strand as politician. Concerning Hitler and Papen, he must have been alerted after 
both had met in Cologne. However, two weeks before Hitler became chancellor, 
Schleicher—at a cabinet meeting—clearly stated that it was not the Nazi leader’s goal to 
gain the chancellorship. Moreover, he still pinned his hopes on Strasser who already had 
lost the struggle about the Nazi party’s strategy against Hitler.303 
Schleicher’s misunderstanding of Papen’s skills and goals paved the way for 
Hitler’s dictatorship. On the one hand, the general knew that Papen—functioning as 
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chancellor—was not a weak, little “Fränzchen” but indeed a fully formed and 
experienced “Franz” who was assertive and very well connected, especially to 
Hindenburg. On the other hand, Schleicher’s politics toward Papen turned his 
predecessor into one of the general’s most powerful enemies. This enemy was at least as 
versed in intrigue and conniving as Schleicher, and, eventually, Papen successfully 
convinced Hindenburg that Schleicher had to be replaced. 
Then there was Schleicher’s split with Groener. Although his mentor was smarter 
and more experienced in politics, Schleicher saw himself as an equal. Indeed, even when 
he worked as Groener’s subordinate in the ministry of defense, Schleicher perceived 
himself more as a member of the cabinet and not simply as a major advisor.304 This 
attitude made Schleicher disinclined to accept advice or acknowledge Groener’s 
expertise. In a moment of severe political crisis, both generals had different opinions 
about the potential prohibition of the SA and the SS, and Schleicher dispossessed his 
fatherly friend—and also started on the final stretch of his own demise, to say nothing of 
the catastrophe of the Third Reich. 
Schleicher perpetually exceeded his authorities in his incapacity to balance the 
ends of statecraft, especially at a time of crisis with an overestimation of military virtue in 
mass politics. Eventually, he respected neither his minister’s authority and his superior 
instincts about the requirement to preclude the enemies of the republic from seizing the 
upper hand, nor the will and the concerns of Germany’s republican democrats. Moreover, 
he misused his access to Hindenburg for selfish activities and endeavored to increase his 
political power through intrigues. 
B. CONSEQUENCES FOR GERMANY AND THE BUNDESWEHR 
The military’s influence in Germany’s politics that arose after Bismarck’s 
dismissal in 1890 and lasted until 1945 as well as the tragic consequences affect the 
nation’s politics even in the 21st century. In the 1950s the Federal Republic of Germany 
faced heavy domestic demonstrations against its rearmament. The 1980s brought political 
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conflicts with regard to the deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles on German soil. Today, 
military celebrations in public are rare and arouse adamant opposition. 
After two total wars on its own territory, millions of losses, broad destruction of 
cities, and the total collapse in 1945—including the loss of the status as great European 
power—Germany’s population carries a deep skepticism with regard to military 
engagements. The German military functions less as a common tool to enforce political 
interests than, for example, in France, Great Britain, or the United States. Berlin usually 
understands military engagements as ultima ratio and, therefore, demonstrates a 
reluctance to deploy the Bundeswehr. This attitude, however, might change somewhat, 
because some foreign partners claim for an increased role of Germany in international 
affairs and military engagements. It is notable that Germany’s contribution to operations 
of NATO of the European Union is already significant. 
It is, furthermore, notable that the nation as we know it today has only existed 
since 1990. The German government, the population, as well as Germany’s neighbors 
have had to get used to an economic power with roughly 80 million people in the center 
of Europe. With regard to the military, there exist no aims to become a great power again.  
The Bundeswehr is an army of the people comprehensively embedded in 
democracy and multilateralism. Germany follows an agenda of security based on 
prosperity and not on force of arms. Its soldiers are democratic citizens in uniform 
(Staatsbürger in Uniform) including a huge spectrum of guaranteed individual rights. The 
concept of Innere Führung is the “bedrock of democratic integration”305 and ensures 
democratic procedures within the German forces. Nevertheless, the relationship between 
the German people and their military is uncommon. In contrast to the U.S. population, the 
Germans hardly take pride in their Bundeswehr. Germany’s former president Horst 
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Köhler called the population’s attitude toward the army “benign neglect.”306 The current 
minister of defense, Thomas de Maizière, seeks to increase the German society’s 
appreciation of the soldiers’ merits through implementing a governmental policy toward 
veterans, a word that used to be unusual in descriptions of former Bundeswehr 
soldiers.307 
Politically, the Bundeswehr has been successfully integrated. Armored military 
activities require a political (civilian) decision by the German parliament (Bundestag). A 
civilian minister, supported by four civilian state secretaries, leads the forces as 
commander-in-chief, an authority that will be transferred to the chancellor in case of 
defense.308 Moreover, currently five of the nine department heads in the ministry of 
defense are civil servants. Civilians also run large parts of the army’s administration, 
budget affairs, as well as procurement programs. With respect to governmental affairs, 
the military has the role of an essential advisor and executer of political will, but the 
required decisions make civilian actors or institutions. 
The ongoing German discussion about pros and cons of the purchase of armed 
drones is a notable example. On the one hand, the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) clearly 
sees the need of such weapon systems.309 On the other hand, the nation faces a broad 
debate among politicians and scholars as well as in the media concerning potential long-
term consequences of a general automation of war-fighting. 
Today, Germany is to a large extent a pacifistic nation. Its geographic situation in 
the center of Europe—surrounded by partners and friends and without a real military 
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threat to the German territory (besides ballistic missiles)—significantly influences the 
nation’s politico-military affairs. The historical context of Germany’s attitude and 
perception of today, however, must not be underappreciated. The diversified, selfish, and 
eventually criminal political activities, in which the Prussian and the German General 
Staff was involved, caused a severe scar in Germany’s civil-military relations as well as 
in the German people’s minds. Without any doubt, Schleicher’s tragic failure as soldier in 
politics is a major burden and warning with regard to civilian-military affairs in the 21st 
century. 
C. OUTLOOK 
Democracy and its defenders at the highest echelons of power in the state can 
never be immune to crisis, and the shifts of power and violence that are inherent in the 
political realm. German strategic culture, including its expressions in defense institutions 
and military organizations, is the frequent butt of misunderstanding from NATO allies, 
whose attitude to the soldier in politics is far more cavalier, if not irresponsible, when 
compared to Germany. The story here forms an important foundation of the self-image 
and professional ethos of German soldiers and the civilians who are their political 
masters. One need have little worry that a German soldier, politicized by crisis and the 
legacy of war, would engineer a change of regime in Berlin as interpreted here, only then 
to perish in a gang land kind of mass killing as on 30 June 1934. 
Such a thing may seem far-fetched today, but the crisis of democracy and 
prosperity that has seized Europe since the world depression of 2007 is a very real thing. 
The impact of an age of terror, irregular warfare and a revival of nationalist, terrorist, and 
other enemies of the established order casts a shadow over the merriment in Berlin’s 
center. Today, hip, young pedestrians frolic with little regard to the misery and suffering 
that once resided in Berlin, most of which began with the hubris of soldiers who thought 
they were better politicians than all others, whose brief encounter with power ended 
under the muzzle blasts of men in black jackets for whom only violence was the highest 
calling. Nonetheless, this history is the warning about the soldier in politics in a time of 
crisis and the blindness that is often its most significant trait. 
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APPENDIX A. THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC’S CABINETS310 
Philipp Scheidemann SPD 13 February to 20 June 1919 
Gustav Bauer SPD 21 June 1919 to 26 March 1920 
Hermann Müller SPD 27. March to 8 June 1920 
Konstantin Fehrenbach Center Party 25 June 1920 to 4 May 1921 
Joseph Wirth Center Party 10 May to 22 October 1921 
Joseph Wirth Center Party 26 October 14 November 1922 
Wilhelm Cuno Neutral 22 November 1922 to 12 August 1923 
Gustav Stresemann DVP311 13 August to 4 October 1923 
Gustav Stresemann DVP 6 October to 23 November 1923 
Wilhelm Marx Center Party 30 November 1923 to 26 May 1924 
Wilhelm Marx Center Party 3 June to 15 December 1924 
Hans Luther Neutral 15 January to 5 December 1925 
Hans Luther Neutral 20 January to 12 May 1926 
Wilhelm Marx Center Party 16 May to 17 December 1926 
Wilhelm Marx Center Party 29 January 1927 to 12 June 1928 
Hermann Müller SPD 28 June 1928 to 27 March 1930 
Heinrich Brüning Center Party 30 March 1930 to 7 October 1931 
Heinrich Brüning Center Party 9 October 1931 to 30 May 1932 
Franz von Papen Centre Party 1 June to 17 November 1932 
Kurt von Schleicher Neutral 3 December 1932 to 28 January 1933 
Adolf Hitler NSDAP From 30 January 1933 
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APPENDIX B. REICHSTAG ELECTIONS RESULTS OF THE 
NSDAP312 
4 May 1924 6,50 percent 
7 December 1924 3,00 
20 May 1928 2,60 
14 September 1930 18,30 
31 July 1932 37,30 
6 November 1932 33,10 
5 March 1933313 43,90 
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313 Hitler German chancellor since 30 January 1933. 
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APPENDIX C. NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED GERMANS314 
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1925 12,362 9,290 
1926 10,001 10,414 
1927 14,228 10,801 
1928 14,001 12,276 
1929 13,447 13,483 
1930 10,393 12,036 
1931 6,727 9,599 
1932 4,667 5,739 
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